Month: May 2026

MAAP #242 Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory (northern Brazilian Amazon)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Photo 1. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA

Yanomami Indigenous Territory, located in the northern Brazilian Amazon (along the border with Venezuela), is one of the territories most impacted by gold mining in the Amazon (MAAP #226).

This report details the results of geospatial monitoring of illegal gold mining activity in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, based on data collected up to December 2025. This territory is located in the northern Brazilian Amazon, along the border with Venezuela.

This monitoring effort, based on the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery and data from collaborative monitoring carried out by the Yanomami and Ye’kwana communities, takes place in a context of operational transition in the territory, marked by the current government’s efforts to remove illegal occupants and the persistence of certain mining hotspots (see Note 1 below).

In recent years, this territory has faced an escalation of illegal mining that peaked in 2022, resulting in an unprecedented humanitarian and health crisis. Current data produced by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (see below for details) reveals that the total area impacted by mining reached 5,564 hectares in 2025.

However, time series analysis demonstrates a critical inflection point: after the peak in 2022, the annual increase in newly impacted mining areas showed major and successive decreases in the years 2023 through 2025. Comparatively, while the accumulated area up to 2023 represents the vast majority of the impact (around 5,500 ha), there has been a documented increase of 129 hectares in 2024 and 2025 (83.95 ha and 45.2 ha, respectively).

This recent slowdown in the rate of mining expansion is a direct result of the command and control operations initiated by the Brazilian government in 2023, shortly after the official recognition of the public health emergency (see Note 2). The data, however, also serves as a warning: although the mining expansion has slowed, the continued detection in both 2024 and 2025 confirms that mining activity has not been completely eradicated. 

Monthly monitoring indicates that illegal mining continues to exert pressure on the territory, miners are adapting to enforcement operations and maintain mining nodes of resistance that require continuity and improvement of territorial protection and monitoring strategies.

Analysis of illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory 

Methodology

Photo 2. Gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory. Photo credit: Lucas Silva/Platô/ISA

The data presented in this report is based on monitoring led by the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental (ISA). This analysis is carried out monthly based on the visual interpretation of satellite images from Planet (monthly mosaics) and the European Space Agency’s Sentinel 2. Mining impact polygons were then generated by incorporating: 1) recent mining deforestation, 2) active mining areas with bare soil, 3) recently abandoned areas with initial vegetation growth (grasses covering gravel pits), and 4) tailings ponds. 

Every month, the impacted regions are revisited to refine the mapping and check for possible misinterpretations. The analysis takes into account not only the spectral response of the objects but also the context. Therefore, all mapping is carried out considering the location of the communities and their cultivated areas, among other information about the Yanomami territory such as airstrips and health posts, which ensures differentiation between the removal of forest cover for traditional agricultural management and deforestation associated with mineral or other types of exploitation.

The systematic remote monitoring of Yanomami Indigenous Territory began in 2018, experimenting with different methodologies. Beginning in 2020, the refinement of impacted areas began using Planet mosaics (3 m spatial resolution). For this reason, 2020 is used as the initial year of detailed analysis.

In the Notes section, we also compare this ISA-led monitoring data with information obtained from Amazon Mining Watch.

In addition to remote monitoring, since 2023 a collaborative monitoring tool has been implemented to record events that pose risks to communities and people in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory. The ‘Wãnori’ Alert System receives and qualifies reports, aiming to strengthen communication between indigenous communities, their organizations, and the Public Authorities. Through a free application (ODK Collect), an alert monitor can report an adverse health event, environmental or territorial threat, using an offline form composed of geographic coordinates and a description of the problem in audio and/or photo. The system uses the form/application as its primary tool for receiving complaints, but it continues to receive information from other sources, such as WhatsApp messages, letters, and radio broadcasts, incorporating this information into a single flow. All alerts are compiled into weekly bulletins and sent to Brazilian authorities.

Results

By December 2025, the total area impacted by illegal mining in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory was mapped at 5,564 hectares (see Note 3 for comparison with Amazon Mining Watch). As seen in Graph 1 (with 2020 baseline at 400 ha), the annual mining impact increased in 2021 (just over 1,000 ha) and peaked in 2022 (nearly 1,800 ha), followed by major decreases in 2023 (330 ha), 2024 (84 ha), and 2025 (45 ha), respectively. This reduction was a result of the intervention of the Brazilian government, which initiated a process of removing illegal miners from the territory in 2023, after recognizing the humanitarian crisis caused by illegal mining among the Yanomami and Ye’kwana peoples.

Graph 1 – Annual increase in the area affected by illegal mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory.

The monitoring documented 45 hectares (across 121 polygons) of new mining deforestation within Yanomami Indigenous Territory in 2025. The vast majority (90%) of the polygons were small mining expansions of less than 1 hectare. This recent mining impact was mostly distributed across six areas: 1) Ericó; 2) Cabeceira do Aracaju; 3) Hokomawaë; 4) Parima-Parafuri; 5) Surucucus/Feijão Queimado; 6) Couto Magalhães (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Illegal gold mining in Yanomami Indigenous Territory, highlighting areas with highest impact in 2025.

The two largest polygons (almost 4 hectares) were identified in Parima (Area 5) and Surucucus, near the Feijão Queimado airstrip (Area 6).

Figure 2 – Comparison of images from January 2025 and November 2025 near the Feijão Queimado airstrip. New deforestation is noticeable in the upper part of image 2.
Figure 3 – Comparison between January 2025 and November 2025 in the Parima region.

The distribution of the new mining areas also indicates a trend towards fragmentation of activity, in contrast to the previous concentration around airstrips (such as Capixaba, Jeremias, Malária, Mucuim). With the exception of the Couto Magalhães river region (Area 6 in Figure 1), where the opening of new areas near old scars continued (Figure 4), the other centers of greater concentration, such as Alto Catrimani, Médio Uraricoera and Homoxi, appear to be relatively neutralized.

Figure 4. – Mapping of illegal mining in the Couto Magalhães River (Papiu and Kayanau regions)

In addition to decentralization, there is also a shift in activity to areas closer to the border with Venezuela (possible leakage or spillover effect), as is the case with the mapped areas in Parafuri-Parima, Hokomawë, and Cabeceira do Aracaçá (Areas 2-4 in Figure 1). It is known that part of this phenomenon is explained by the possibility of “circumventing” inspection by using logistical hubs located in Venezuelan territory, such as the airstrips in Dicão and Simada Ocho.

In 2025, the Yanomami Indigenous Territory’s alert system recorded at least five alerts regarding the movement of clandestine aircraft in the Auaris region. In most cases, the aircraft flew in the direction of Hokomawë, towards the Gaúcho Animal airstrip, located at the mouth of the Auaris River, or towards the airstrip located at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River (supposedly the Gongo airstrip). See Figure 5, which zooms in on Area 2 of Figure 1.

Figure 5 – Mapping of illegal mining at the headwaters of the Aracaçá River, near the Gongo airstrip and the border with Venezuela.

With respect to the ‘Wãnori’ Alert System, in 2025, it recorded a total of 66 territorial alerts, of which the vast majority (83%) were invasion alerts (Graph 2), which include information on the movement of clandestine aircraft, boats, barges, and other vehicles. There were also records of attacks and the entry of firearms. Cases of missing persons were resolved, without being actually associated with violence in the illegal mining areas.

Graph 2 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by alert type

Figure 6 illustrates the spatial distribution of the alerts, again highlighting the concentration in the north of the territory, near the border with Venezuela.

Figure 6 – Heat map of territorial alerts for 2024 and 2025

The area with the highest number of alerts, Apiaú  (Chart 3), was also among the regions that registered airspace intrusion alerts (see Annex 1 for photo evidence), possibly associated with illegal mining on the Couto Magalhães River. 

Alto Catrimani also had airspace alerts. In this case, the connection between this activity and illegal mining in the headwaters of the Orinoco River, in Venezuelan territory, is notable; this is one of the areas with the highest levels of illegal mining activity in recent years.

Other areas with airspace intrusion alerts include Auaris and Xitei (see Annex 2 for photo evidence). It should also be noted that, even though the Taboca airstrip is located in Venezuela, it supports the remaining fragments of illegal mining in the Alto Catrimani and Xitei regions, such as the mining operation located near the Pixahanapi community .It is worth noting that in the case of the Xitei mining operation (see Annex 3 for community alert), the warnings reinforce the residents’ concern regarding the entry of ammunition and firearms brought by the miners with the aim of recruiting young people and threatening leaders who oppose mineral exploration in the region. Since 2021, Xitei has been marked by violent conflicts associated with mining, and 2025 was no different. In 2025 alone, it is estimated that at least five people died due to these conflicts.

Graph 3 – Territorial alerts in 2025 by region

In addition to airspace violations, the alert system also recorded many instances of illegal incursions along the rivers of Yanomami Indigenous Territory, namel the Uraricoera, Catrimani, Apiaú, and Ajarani. In some cases, the river traffic was associated with the operation of barges and dredges, in others simply for the transport of cassiterite, or the entry of supplies to replenish the camps.

The Lower Catrimani region has reported the most instances of river invasion. From April to December 2025, nine alerts were issued regarding the presence of barges, dredges, and suspicious boats (Figure 7).

Figure 7 – Boat with supplies for illegal mining in the Lower Catrimani region and a mining dredge operating near the Yanomami community in the same region.

From Apiaú, reports have emerged of an alleged trail for ATVs that would serve to supply the mining operations located upstream and bypass the site where the new National Indigenous Foundation (Funai) base is being installed. The trail would connect existing secondary roads outside the territory and reach the Ingarana stream, a tributary of the Apiaú River (Figure 8).

Figure 8 – Map of the Apiaú region showing the location of the alleged portage.

Finally, another noteworthy region is Ericó, an area accessible via the Uraricaá River, where significant signs of deforestation associated with mining were observed in 2025. During the period from 2018 to 2022, there were records of dredges operating on the Uraricaá River; however, there were no clear signs of land-based mining in the region. With the intensification of operations in other parts of the territory, however, there appears to have been a spillover into this basin, which, being further from the main areas of surveillance, ended up becoming vulnerable. See Figure 9, which zooms in on Area 1 of Figure 1.

Figure 9 – Mapping of illegal mining in the Uraricaá River

Annex

Annex 1. Aircraft registration in service of the mining operation in Apiaú

Annex 2.Illegal mining plane registered in Xitei

Annex 3. Video sent to the Alert System, which records the presence of illegal miners operating at night, near the Pixahanapi community, Xitei.

Policy Implications & Recommendations

Analysis of the 2025 data indicates a significant inflection point in the dynamics of illegal mining. Although the total impacted area amounts to 5,564 hectares, there has been a substantial and successive decrease in the annual expansion of newly degraded areas since the peak in 2022. In 2025, only 45.2 hectares of new areas were recorded, distributed across 121 polygons, most of which are less than 1 hectare.

However, miners’ ability to adapt to the government operations is observed, by adopting some fragmentation and decentralization strategies, moving to areas closer to the border with Venezuela to utilize logistical distribution hubs outside the limits of inspection. Furthermore, the persistence of some extremely resilient mining nodes is noted, as is the case with the mining in the Couto Magalhães River.

With this in mind, to consolidate the results of land clearing operations and address the reentry of criminal activity within the territory, the following actions are recommended:

  • All enforcement agencies should maintain operations to combat illegal mining in the remaining areas, with the complete destruction of machinery used in mineral extraction and the application of the respective administrative sanctions;
  • To ensure continuous remote monitoring of Yanomami territory as well as rapid responses to new alerts from security forces;
  • To guarantee the maintenance of the physical structures and the minimum staff for the continuous operation of the existing Protection Posts (Ajarani, Xexena, Walopali, Serra da Estrutura and Pakilapi);
  • Finalize the construction of the Apiaú and Kayanau Protection Posts;
  • Install new Protection Posts on strategic rivers that serve as routes for illegal mining, specifically on the Uraricaá and Catrimani rivers;
  • Implement more efficient river barriers on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Uraricaá, and Catrimani rivers.
  • To promote regular State enforcement agencies’ patrols on the Uraricoera, Mucajaí, Ajarani, Apiaú, Uraricaá, Catrimani, Parima and Couto Magalhães rivers.
  • Enhanced airspace control and strict enforcement of the Brazilian Aeronautical Code.
  • Disabling all clandestine airstrips and seized aircraft within Yanomami territory (Integrated Territory of Yanomami).
  • To promote regular inspection actions on highways, gas stations, airports, and ports located around Yanomami territory. 
  • Support from the federal government for the implementation of the Indigenous Surveillance Plan, integrating information from the communities’ Alert System with state action;
  • Implement a strict sanitary and territorial protection cordon around the territory of the isolated groups, led by the Indigenous Peoples’ National Foundation (FUNAI) and the Health District (Distrito Sanitário) with support from the National Forces;
  • The FUNAI or the Government House (Casa de Governo) should lead the development of a plan to encourage voluntary disarmament in sensitive regions.
  • The Brazilian government should foster spaces for governance and dialogue, with members of the government, indigenous associations, and technical partners from civil society, to monitor the implementation of territorial protection actions.
  • The Brazilian government should develop, translate, and distribute regular newsletters to communities about territorial protection actions and their progress.
  • The national government should coordinate with the Venezuelan government joint actions to combat the logistical “hubs” located just across the border, which serve as refuge for illegal miners and escape routes.

Notes

1. Operational transition refers to the changes in the model, regularity, and intensity of enforcement actions taken following the change in government. https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/2024/02/29/casa-de-governo-com-foco-na-crise-yanomami-e-instalada-em-rr-com-orcamento-de-r-1-bilhao.ghtml

2. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2023/decreto/D11405.htm

3. For comparison, Amazon Mining Watch has detected 2,470 hectares in Yanomami Indigenous Territory between 2018 and 2025. This data also shows a peak in 2022 (increase of 850 ha), followed by declines in 2023 (250 ha) and 2024 (80 ha). AMW did not detect any new mining in 2025. Importantly, the overall detected spatial patterns are similar, with both monitoring systems highlighting the concentration in the northern part of the territory.

4. Protection bases are control points managed by Funai that provide support for operations by other enforcement agencies, such as Ibama and the Federal Police.

5. The River Barriers function as control points and nautical blockades managed by Funai, with support from Ibama and the Federal Police, to prevent logistical access by wildcat miners and intruders to the rivers of the Yanomami Indigenous Territory.

6. This should involve regulatory agencies alongside environmental enforcement and command-and-control bodies, such as the National Civil Aviation Agency – ANAC (for airfield inspections), the National Petroleum Agency – ANP (for fuel station inspections), and the National Land Transport Agency – ANTT (for road and highway inspections).

7. https://acervo.socioambiental.org/acervo/documentos/urihi-noamatima-thepe-plano-de-vigilancia-indigena-da-ti-yanomami

Acknowledgments 

This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report

MAAP #241: Rapid Expansion of Illegal Gold Mining in Tambopata National Reserve (Southern Peruvian Amazon)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Image 1. Recent expansion of illegal gold mining in Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Gold mining has been a notorious driver of deforestation in the southern Peruvian Amazon for several decades. This mining-related deforestation reached crisis levels in the mid-2010s, particularly affecting Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone (see MAAP #96 from January 2019). This situation led to the major government operation known as “Operation Mercury” in February 2019, and a subsequent initiative known as the “Restoration Plan” in 2021.

After a period of reduced mining activity due to Operation Mercury and the Restoration Plan, illegal gold mining has resumed an alarming expansion within Tambopata National Reserve, primarily during the second half of 2025 and early 2026 (see Graph 1 below).

During this recent period (2025–26), we find that a total area of ​​500 hectares was deforested due to illegal mining in the northern part of the Reserve along the Malinowski River, which forms part of its northern boundary (see Base Map below).

Analyzing very high-resolution satellite imagery (Planet’s SkySat, 0.5m), we detected a total of 183 mining structures (such as heavy equipment and excavators) and 67 mining camps across five mining zones within the northern part of Tambopata National Reserve, as of February 2026.

Based on this finding, we estimate that around 1,000 people are currently involved in illegal mining activities in the Reserve, using a conversion factor derived from the machinery and camps detected within the mining zones (ACCA, 2022).

In response to this situation, the Peruvian government has initiated several actions in early 2026 (January – March) to address the expanding invasion of illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve. Through coordination between police and military institutions, these interventions have resulted in the seizure and destruction of machinery, equipment, and encampments used in illegal mining activities within the Reserve (Joint Command of the Armed Forces, 2026).

Below, we present:

  • Annual mining deforestation trends in Tambopata National Reserve (2016–2025);
    .
  • Four case studies featuring satellite imagery to illustrate the most recent mining expansion within the Reserve.
    .
  • 5 pillars of public policy regarding illegal mining in Tambopata National Reserve, including enforcement operations and state limitations; legislative setbacks and threats; and the 2026 political election.

Annual Mining Deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve

Graph 1 shows annual mining deforestation within Tambopata National Reserve for the period 2016–2025. The main ecosystems affected by this mining activity were the Alluvial Floodplain Forest and Non-Floodplain Terrace Forest.

Graph 1. Mining Deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACA, ACCA, BCRP, CINCIA, MapBiomas Perú.

During this period, three key events stand out:

First, Operation Mercury—a multisectoral intervention against illegal mining in critical zones of the Madre de Dios region, carried out in early 2019—resulted in a major reduction that same year compared to 2016 and 2017, when higher levels of mining expansion were recorded. During 2017 and 2018, a series of operations and interdictions were launched in the region that helped combat the advance of illegal mining (AIDER, 2021). Coupled with these actions, the success of Operation Mercury led to a substantial reduction in mining expansion within the Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone (MAAP #104, MAAP #121).

Second, the “Restoration Plan“—a series of military interventions conducted in 2021 in critical illegal mining zones within the southern Peruvian Amazon—also resulted in a major decrease in mining deforestation that same year, compared to the previous year. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, difficulties arose regarding the execution of operations and patrols within Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone, leading to a reduction in police and military presence in key sectors (AIDER, 2021; DAR, 2023; Vadillo, 2022). Consequently, instances of illegal miners re-entering Tambopata were recorded (Romo, 2020). In response, the renewed military operations successfully combated the expansion of illegal mining activity in the Madre de Dios region, including Tambopata.

Thirdly, during 2025-early 2026, we recorded an alarming gold mining deforestation expansion (500 hectares), surpassing the figures registered during the critical years of 2016 and 2017 that led up to Operation Mercury. This sudden increase was likely driven by the exponential rise in the international price of gold (see red line in Graph 1). Thus, it is likely that the sustained rise in gold prices has influenced the expansion of illegal mining in recent years by boosting the expected profitability derived from the trade of extracted ore.

Base Map & Case Studies

The Base Map displays the recent expansion of 500 hectares deforested by illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve during the second half of 2025 (431 hectares) and early 2026 (69 hectares through February). Mining activity is concentrated in the northwestern part of the Reserve, in areas adjacent to the Malinowski River. Furthermore, it has been identified that this illegal activity is taking place in the vicinity of several of the Reserve’s surveillance posts. Insets A–D indicate the location of the four case studies.

Base Map. Illegal Gold Mining Activity in the Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACA, ACCA, CINCIA, MapBiomas Perú.

Case Study A. Sector Isla Córdoba

In this area, located in the northwest corner of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box A in the Base Map), we recorded 106 hectares of mining deforestation between January 2025 and January 2026 (Figure A1). Note that this mining zone is situated near the Reserve’s Otorongo surveillance and control post (see Base Map).

Figure A1. Mining deforestation in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Figure A2 shows that a large portion of this deforestation (80%) occurred between July and December 2025 (indicated in orange) and continued to expand until early 2026 (red). This sector has recorded mining activity in previous years (blue), primarily between 2017 and 2018. As part of the actions undertaken during Operation Mercury in 2019, military operations were carried out to intervene in the mining zones located within this sector, achieving a reduction in the expansion of illegal mining during this period (Salazar, 2024).

Figure A2. Mining deforestation in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

The presence of gold mining infrastructure has expanded into the various pools located in this sector, with a total of 53 dredges and 20 mining camps recorded in February 2026 (Figure A3).

Figure A3. Mining infrastructure in the Isla Córdoba sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Case Study B. Sector A4

In this area, also located in the northwest corner of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box B on the Base Map), we recorded 101 hectares of mining deforestation between February 2025 and February 2026 (Figure B1).

Figure B1. Mining deforestation in Sector A4 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Figure B2 shows that, in early 2025, we detected the expansion of the first mining zones in this sector into the interior of Tambopata National Reserve (indicated yellow). Subsequently, between July and December 2025, an increase of 83 hectares of mining activity was recorded (orange), representing 82% of the total recorded. This increase in mining activity continued until early 2026 (red), expanding further into the interior of the Reserve.

Figure B2. Data: ACCA, Planet

In this sector, we recorded 68 mining structures located within pits, as well as the presence of 33 mining camps, in February 2026 (Figure B3). The number of structures identified in this zone was higher compared to the other sectors analyzed.

Figure B3. Mining infrastructure in Sector A4 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Caso Study C. Sector A7

In this area, located in the northern part of Tambopata National Reserve (see Box C on the Base Map), we recorded 25 hectares of mining deforestation between February 2025 and February 2026 along the Malinowski River (Figure C1). This new mining zone is situated near the Azul surveillance and control post (see Base Map).

Figure C1. Mining deforestation in Sector A7 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Figure C2 shows that mining began in the second half of 2025 (indicated in orange), marked by the presence of a mining pit adjacent to the Malinowski River, and subsequently expanded over the following months. In 2026 (red), we recorded an increase of 17 hectares, representing 68% of total deforestation. No mining infrastructure was recorded in this sector due to the lack of available very high-resolution satellite imagery for 2026.

Figure C2. Mining deforestation in Sector A7 of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Case Study D. Sector Isla Correntada

In this area, located in the northeast of Tambopata National Reserve (see inset D on the Base Map), we recorded 111 hectares of mining deforestation between January 2025 and January 2026 (Figure D1). This mining zone is situated near the Yarinal surveillance and control post (see Base Map).

Figure D1. Mining deforestation in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Figure D2 shows that mining began expanding slightly during the January–June 2025 period (indicated in yellow). Subsequently, an advancement of mining activity was detected starting in July 2025. The expansion of mining was greatest during the July–December 2025 period, during which a total of 85 hectares of deforestation were recorded (orange), representing 76% of the total. As of 2026, mining continues to expand in various zones within the Isla Correntada sector (red).

Figure D2. Mining deforestation in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

A total of 11 mining structures have been identified within various mining pits, and three mining camps have also been located in this sector. Figure D3 depicts various mining structures engaged in gold extraction near the Malinowski River, as well as the presence of a mining camp.

Figure D3. Mining infrastructure in the Isla Correntada sector of Tambopata National Reserve. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Public Policies Addressing Illegal Mining in the Tambopata National Reserve

The satellite imagery analysis presented in this report documents the advancement of illegal mining deforestation within Tambopata National Reserve during the 2025–2026 period. To contextualize these findings, this section examines the Peruvian State’s public policy framework during the same period, identifying the institutional, regulatory, and political factors that directly or indirectly influence the dynamics observed within the reserve.

The analysis is organized around five key themes:

  • The State’s Response: Operations and Interdiction;
  • Structural Limitations of the State Response;
  • Legislative Setbacks Favoring Illegal Mining;
  • Legislative Threats to Protected Natural Areas;
  • 2026 Political and Electoral Context.

Taken together, the regulatory and institutional landscape of the 2025–2026 period reflects a structural tension between the control measures deployed by the Executive Branch and a regressive legislative trend that has weakened mechanisms for prevention, oversight, and enforcement. This contradiction constitutes one of the primary explanatory factors behind the expansion of illegal mining documented in the analyzed satellite imagery. Each of these key areas is discussed in detail below.

1. State Response: Operations and Interdiction

In response to the encroachment of illegal mining within Tambopata National Reserve, the Peruvian State implemented a series of operational and regulatory control measures during the 2025–2026 period. The most persistent exceptional measure in the region is the state of emergency in Madre de Dios, in effect uninterruptedly since April 7, 2023, when it was declared by Supreme Decree No. 046-2023-PCM. This declaration encompasses the districts of Tambopata, Inambari, Las Piedras, and Laberinto—all located within the Tambopata province—as well as the districts of Madre de Dios and Huepetuhe in the Manu province. The measure mandated that the Peruvian National Police (PNP) assume control of internal order, supported by the Armed Forces, with the specific aim of combating illegal mining, illegal logging, and illicit drug trafficking within the region.

Building upon this declaration, land- and river-based interdiction operations were carried out within the Reserve.  The National Service of Natural Protected Areas (SERNANP)—in coordination with the National Police of Peru (PNP), the General Directorate of Captaincies and Coast Guards of Peru (DICAPI), and the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor’s Office (FEMA)—activated, through the Second Amazon Protection Brigade, a dynamic control strategy featuring continuous patrols at critical points within the reserve, with particular emphasis on the Otorongo, Azul, Yarinal, and Malinowski sectors—the latter serving as a key hub for both riverine and land-based control along the reserve’s northern boundary.

The scope of these interventions, carried out between January and March 2026, was considerable in terms of the equipment seized or destroyed by authorities, including mining rafts, engines, motors, pumps, generators, fuel, and motorcycles. In addition, 340 mining camps were dismantled. Nevertheless, satellite monitoring indicates that these actions failed to reverse the expansion of mining activity in the targeted sectors (see Figure A2).

Parallel to these actions in the field, the Executive sought to strengthen the legal framework for prosecuting crime. On January 20, 2026, it promulgated Legislative Decree No. 1695, which amends the Penal Code to stiffen penalties against illegal mining, establishing prison sentences of five to eight years for those who engage in mining activities without authorization or outside the formalization process, and six to nine years for those who traffic in chemical inputs, machinery, or minerals of illicit origin (Presidency of the Republic of Peru, 2026).

Furthermore, the regulation expressly incorporates illegal mining into the scope of the Law Against Organized Crime (Law No. 30077), thereby enabling the use of special investigative tools for the prosecution of these networks. Additionally, on February 5, 2026, a new extension of the state of emergency was ordered for an additional 60 days by means of Supreme Decree No. 017-2026-PCM, the validity of which was extended until April 6, 2026. However, the effectiveness of these measures—both operational and regulatory—encountered concrete limitations, which are analyzed in the following section.

2. Structural Limitations of the State Response

Despite the operational deployment described in the previous section, the State’s response faced limitations that reduced its effectiveness and that explain, in part, the continued advance of illegal mining documented in satellite imagery. The most critical limitation was budgetary in nature: the special units of the Peruvian Navy, which maintained a permanent presence at control and surveillance posts along the Malinowski River (the natural boundary between the Reserve and its buffer zone), were withdrawn during 2025 due to a lack of funding. This interrupted interdiction operations in one of the most active entry corridors for illegal mining into the interior of the reserve—a fact consistent with the data presented in the Base Map (Chumpitaz, 2025).

This absence of a continuous field presence resulted in a response capacity that was reactive rather than preventive. Although the High Commissioner for the Fight Against Illegal Mining, Rodolfo García Esquerre, noted that the budget allocated to this struggle was increased for 2026, specialists warned that such an increase would prove insufficient as long as current regulations continue to foster conditions of impunity for illegal operators (Chumpitaz, 2025). Along similar lines, the Illegal Mining Observatory (OMI) pointed out that judges, prosecutors, and government attorneys face budgetary constraints and a shortage of specialized personnel, thereby jeopardizing the effective enforcement of Legislative Decree No. 1695, approved in January 2026 (Pizarro, 2026).

The result of these limitations is a structural gap between the State’s operational response and the scale of the problem. The fact that the Madre de Dios region has been under a continuous state of emergency since April 2023—with consecutive extensions every 60 days—attests to the chronic nature of the phenomenon and the inadequacy of the measures adopted to reverse it in a sustained manner: interdiction operations succeed in dismantling specific equipment and camps, but they fail to prevent the reconstitution of criminal networks or the steady advance of the mining frontier deeper into the reserve. This gap cannot be explained solely by budgetary constraints or limitations in institutional capacity, but also by a series of legislative setbacks that—as analyzed in the following section—have worked at cross-purposes with the control efforts deployed in the field.

3. Legislative Setbacks Favoring Illegal Mining

As noted in the previous section, the limitations of the state response cannot be explained solely by operational or budgetary constraints, but also by a series of legislative amendments approved during the 2025–2026 period that have weakened the mechanisms for preventing, overseeing, and sanctioning illegal mining. These regulations—approved concurrently with interdiction operations—create a contradictory regulatory framework that reduces the effectiveness of control actions deployed in the field.

The most significant setback was the fifth extension of the Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO), approved by the Congressional Plenary in December 2025 and enacted by the Executive Branch via Law No. 32537 on December 26 of the same year. Through this measure, the deadline for the mining formalization process was extended until the end of 2026, with the possibility of an earlier closure should the MAPE Law and its implementing regulations enter into force prior to that date. It is worth noting that this marks the fifth consecutive extension of a mechanism originally conceived as transitional; previous extensions occurred in 2019, 2024, June 2025, and December 2025 (Zevallos Morón, 2026). Isabel Calle (2025) pointed out that, with this extension, the country remains trapped in a system that has failed to drive effective formalization and has, on the contrary, created incentives for non-compliance with the law, thereby exacerbating environmental degradation in regions such as Madre de Dios.

Compounding this setback are additional amendments that have weakened the legal tools available for combating illegal mining. Congress repealed the First Final Complementary Provision of Legislative Decree No. 1607, which had amended Law No. 30077 on Organized Crime, thereby curtailing the National Police’s (PNP) authority to take action regarding the illegal possession of explosives—particularly in cases involving miners suspended from the REINFO registry. This measure drew harsh criticism from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which warned that its implementation could facilitate illicit activities linked to informal mining (Tuesta, 2024).

Taken together, these legislative setbacks create a scenario in which interdiction operations and the stricter penalties introduced by Legislative Decree No. 1695 operate within a regulatory framework that simultaneously broadens the scope of tolerance toward informal mining. Furthermore, this landscape is compounded by legislative initiatives that pose a direct threat to the region’s Natural Protected Areas, as discussed in the following section.

4. Legislative Threats to Protected Natural Areas

Added to the landscape of legislative setbacks described in the previous section are parliamentary initiatives during this same period that pose a direct threat to the legal protection framework for Protected Areas in the Madre de Dios region, including ecosystems adjacent to Tambopata National Reserve. Unlike the regulations analyzed previously, these initiatives do not merely weaken existing oversight mechanisms regarding illegal mining; rather, they aim to alter the legal protection status of spaces that currently constitute the final institutional barrier against the expansion of extractive activities in the region.

The first of these initiatives is Bill No. 1822/2024-CR, introduced on July 2, 2025, by Congressman Jorge Luis Flores Ancachi (Acción Popular). The proposal seeks to amend nine articles of the Protected Natural Areas Law (Law No. 26834), thereby opening the door to hydrocarbon extraction activities in spaces that currently enjoy the highest level of legal protection—such as national parks, as well as national and historical sanctuaries—and granting the Ministry of Energy and Mines greater authority over the management of these areas. Vanessa Cueto warned that, should this amendment be approved, protected areas would ultimately become mere “paper parks,” left exposed to the impacts of high-intensity extractive activities. Among the areas directly affected are Bahuaja Sonene and Manu National Parks, both of which border the Tambopata National Reserve (Sierra Praeli, 2023). Along similar lines, on March 20, 2026, Congressman Eduardo Salhuana introduced Bill No. 14288/2025-CR, which would declare the development of the Madre de Dios gas basin to be a matter of national interest and strategic priority. The bill would—on an exceptional basis—authorize gas exploration and exploitation activities within “indirect-use” Protected Natural Areas (ANPs), including the Manu and Bahuaja Sonene National Parks, as well as the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve. Critics have argued that the approval of this bill would constitute a regulatory regression of the highest order, given that both the Manu National Park and the Bahuaja Sonene National Park are indirect-use ANPs which, under current legislation, expressly prohibit the extraction of natural resources within their boundaries (SPDA, 2026).

During the same period, Bill No. 3377—originally introduced in October 2022 by the same congressman—was reactivated. This bill proposes to authorize the granting of mining concessions over areas that have reverted to State control due to non-compliance with obligations, inactivity, or other grounds for termination or annulment. If approved, this proposal would lift the current restrictions on the granting of new mining concessions in Madre de Dios (Salazar Vega, 2026).

These bills—although still in the legislative debate stage at the time this report was finalized—reflect a trend toward subordinating the region’s environmental protection to extractive interests. This is occurring within a context where pressure on Tambopata National Reserve has already reached critical levels, according to the satellite data analyzed. This scenario is further exacerbated by political and social factors, which are examined in the following section.

5. Violence Against Environmental Defenders and the 2026 Political-Electoral Context

The scenario of legislative pressure and institutional weakness described in the preceding sections unfolds within a social and political context that further exacerbates the situation of Tambopata National Reserve. Two factors stand out in this regard: the violence perpetrated against those who defend the territory, and the absence of a robust environmental agenda within the framework of the 2026 national electoral process.

As an example regarding violence against environmental defenders, on July 26, 2025, Hipólito Quispe Huamán—an environmental defender for Tambopata National Reserve—was murdered while traveling toward his home along the Interoceanic Highway in Madre de Dios. His death adds to the more than 30 killings of environmental defenders and Indigenous leaders recorded in Peru since 2020, solidifying a pattern of violence that functions as a deterrent against those who monitor and denounce illegal activities within the reserve (Sierra Praeli, 2025).

Compounding this factor is the political-electoral context of 2026. The national electoral process—which entails the renewal of both the Executive and Legislative branches—is unfolding against a backdrop of political instability and the progressive weakening of environmental policies. Although Peru’s natural capital underpins approximately 20% of the GDP and 65% of national agriculture, the environment does not occupy a central place in the candidates’ proposals, according to experts consulted by various organizations (Guardia Brown, 2026). This absence of structural political will implies that the substantive decisions necessary to halt the advance of illegal mining in the Reserve—such as the approval of an effective MAPE Law, the definitive closure of the REINFO, or the budgetary strengthening of SERNANP—are unlikely to be addressed in the short term, thereby prolonging the window of vulnerability documented in this report.

6. Public Policy Conclusion

An analysis of the Peruvian State’s public policy framework during the 2025–2026 period reveals a scenario of profound institutional contradiction. On one hand, the Executive branch implemented concrete response measures to address the mining crisis in Tambopata National Reserve, including declaring a state of emergency in the province of Tambopata, conducting land- and river-based interdiction operations, and strengthening the penal framework through Legislative Decree No. 1695. On the other hand, these actions operate upon a normative and institutional foundation that has simultaneously been undermined by regressive legislative decisions, structural budgetary constraints, parliamentary initiatives threatening the legal status of the region’s natural Protected Areas, and a climate of violence against environmental defenders that diminishes territorial surveillance capacity.

This contradiction is not merely circumstantial but structural: it reflects the absence of a comprehensive and sustained policy for the protection of the Reserve—one that coherently integrates the available operational, normative, budgetary, and institutional instruments. One indication of this is that, given the magnitude of the problem, SERNANP is promoting the establishment of a unified command to combat illegal mining, recognizing that the PNP’s capacity for territorial control has been overwhelmed by the scale of the phenomenon and that a more comprehensive intervention by the Armed Forces is required.

In this regard, the findings from the satellite analysis presented in this report cannot be interpreted solely as the result of the activities of criminal networks, but also as the territorial manifestation of an environmental governance framework that, during the period under review, failed to halt the encroachment of illegal mining or reverse the deforestation trend in one of the country’s most critical protected natural areas. The contrast with the results of Operation Mercury in 2019 and Plan Restoration in 2021—both associated with measurable reductions in deforestation documented in Graph 1—suggests that the effectiveness of the State does not depend on the absence of tools, but rather on the coordination, coherence, and sustainability with which these are deployed.

Methodology

The identification of gold mining deforestation in Tambopata National Reserve utilized historical mining deforestation data in the Madre de Dios region, generated by the Center for Amazonian Scientific Innovation (CINCIA) for the years 1984–2019, by MapBiomas Perú for 2020, and by Amazon Conservation (ACA) for the period from January 2021 to March 2024.

Next, the LandTrendR algorithm was used to identify forest loss in monthly Planet NICFI mosaics for the period April 2024 – July 2025. For the period August 2025 – February 2026, mining deforestation (identified using the monthly Planet NICFI mosaics at 4.7 m spatial resolution) was monitored to record the expansion of mining-related deforestation within the Reserve.

The identification of mining infrastructure and camps was based on the visual interpretation of very-high-resolution satellite imagery (Skysat from Planet) obtained (tasked) for the mining zones identified within Tambopata National Reserve.

References

Alza, R. (27 de febrero de 2026). Estado intensifica lucha contra minería ilegal en Tambopata. Rumbo Minero. https://www.rumbominero.com/actualidad/estado-intensifica-lucha-contra-mineria-ilegal-en-tambopata/

Andina. (4 de febrero de 2026). Normas Legales: prorrogan estado de emergencia en diversos distritos de Madre de Dios. Andina. https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-normas-legales-prorrogan-estado-emergencia-diversos-distritos-madre-dios-1061822.aspx

Asociación para la Investigación y Desarrollo Integral – AIDER. (2021). Minería ilegal en la zona de amortiguamiento de la Reserva Nacional Tambopata. Cartilla N°17. https://aider.com.pe/publicacionesca/cartillas/Cartilla_Mineria_2021_VF_opt.pdf

Calle, I. (28 de noviembre de 2025). El Reinfo: una excepción que se volvió norma. SPDA. https://spda.org.pe/noticia/el-reinfo-una-excepcion-que-se-volvio-norma/

Chumpitaz, O. (31 de diciembre de 2025). Mafias mantienen en vilo al Parque Nacional del Manu y a la Reserva Nacional de Tambopata. La República. https://larepublica.pe/politica/2025/12/31/mafias-mantienen-en-vilo-al-parque-nacional-del-manu-y-a-la-reserva-nacional-de-tambopata-mineria-ilegal-hnews-775496

Conservación Amazónica (ACCA), Proyecto Prevenir – USAID. (2022). Estimación de la población minera informal e ilegal en el departamento de Madre de Dios, a partir del uso de imágenes satelitales sub métricas. https://repositorio.profonanpe.org.pe/handle/20.500.14150/2744

Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas. (2026). Comando Operacional del Sur asesta golpe de S/ 1.7 millones contra la minería en Tambopata. Presidencia de la República del Perú. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/ccffaa/noticias/1374254-comando-operacional-del-sur-asesta-golpe-de-s-1-7-millones-contra-la-mineria-ilegal-en-tambopata

Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales – DAR. (2023). Desafiando la legalidad y la justicia: La minería ilegal en Madre de Dios. Lima, Perú. https://dar.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Mineria-ilegal-en-Madre-de-Dios-version-final.pdf

Finer, M., Mamani, N. (2020). Reducción de Minería Ilegal en la Amazonía Peruana Sur. MAAP: 121. https://www.maapprogram.org/es/mineria-peru-2020/

Guardia Brown. (26 de enero de 2026). Desafíos ambientales del Perú en 2026: minería ilegal, crimen organizado y gobernanza ambiental en un contexto electoral. Pulso PUCP. https://pulso.pucp.edu.pe/noticias/desafios-ambientales-del-peru-en-2026-mineria-ilegal-crimen-organizado-y-gobernanza-ambiental-en-un-contexto-electoral

Inforegión Redacción. (15 de enero de 2026). Destruyen 24 máquinas utilizadas para la minería ilegal en la Reserva Nacional de Tambopata. Inforegión. https://inforegion.pe/destruyen-24-maquinas-utilizadas-para-la-mineria-ilegal-en-la-reserva-nacional-de-tambopata/

Mongabay Latam. (18 de julio de 2025). ¿Qué cambios busca el proyecto de ley de Áreas Naturales Protegidas en Perú? Mongabay. https://es.mongabay.com/podcast/2025/07/que-cambios-busca-el-proyecto-de-ley-de-areas-naturales-protegidas-en-peru/

Pizarro, O. (4 de febrero de 2026). Minería ilegal en Perú: nuevo decreto endurece penas, pero no ataca las causas de fondo. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2026/02/04/mineria-ilegal-en-peru-nuevo-decreto-endurece-penas-pero-no-ataca-las-causas-de-fondo/

Presidencia de la República del Perú. (20 de enero de 2026). Gobierno fortalece medidas para combatir delito de minería ilegal. Presidencia de la República del Perú. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/presidencia/noticias/1337593-gobierno-fortalece-medidas-para-combatir-delito-de-mineria-ilegal

Romo, V. (2020). Perú: Minería ilegal entra a la Reserva Nacional Tambopata ante ausencia temporal de la policía. Mongabay. https://es.mongabay.com/2020/03/peru-tambopata-mineria-ilegal-ausencia-de-policia/

Salazar, E. (2024). La violencia replegó al Estado peruano y presiona la Reserva Nacional Tambopata en Perú. Mongabay. https://es.mongabay.com/2024/07/violencia-replego-al-estado-peruano-presiona-reserva-nacional-tambopata-peru/

Guardia Brown. (26 de enero de 2026). Desafíos ambientales del Perú en 2026: minería ilegal, crimen organizado y gobernanza ambiental en un contexto electoral. Pulso PUCP. https://pulso.pucp.edu.pe/noticias/desafios-ambientales-del-peru-en-2026-mineria-ilegal-crimen-organizado-y-gobernanza-ambiental-en-un-contexto-electoral

Inforegión Redacción. (15 de enero de 2026). Destruyen 24 máquinas utilizadas para la minería ilegal en la Reserva Nacional de Tambopata. Inforegión. https://inforegion.pe/destruyen-24-maquinas-utilizadas-para-la-mineria-ilegal-en-la-reserva-nacional-de-tambopata/

Mongabay Latam. (18 de julio de 2025). ¿Qué cambios busca el proyecto de ley de Áreas Naturales Protegidas en Perú? Mongabay. https://es.mongabay.com/podcast/2025/07/que-cambios-busca-el-proyecto-de-ley-de-areas-naturales-protegidas-en-peru/

Pizarro, O. (4 de febrero de 2026). Minería ilegal en Perú: nuevo decreto endurece penas, pero no ataca las causas de fondo. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2026/02/04/mineria-ilegal-en-peru-nuevo-decreto-endurece-penas-pero-no-ataca-las-causas-de-fondo/

Presidencia de la República del Perú. (20 de enero de 2026). Gobierno fortalece medidas para combatir delito de minería ilegal. Presidencia de la República del Perú. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/presidencia/noticias/1337593-gobierno-fortalece-medidas-para-combatir-delito-de-mineria-ilegal

Vadillo Vila, J. (2022). La minería ilegal y su impacto en tiempos de pandemia. Diario El Peruano. https://elperuano.pe/noticia/170967-la-mineria-ilegal-hoy

Zevallos Morón, J. (26 de diciembre de 2025). Gobierno promulgó ley que amplía la vigencia del Reinfo hasta diciembre de 2026. RPP. https://rpp.pe/politica/gobierno/gobierno-promulgo-ley-que-amplia-la-vigencia-del-reinfo-hasta-diciembre-de-2026-noticia-1669269

Acknowledgments

We express our gratitude to the Sub-directorate of Strategic Information and Research on Protected Natural Areas and the Sub-directorate of Supervision, Surveillance, and Control of the National Service of Protected Natural Areas by the State (SERNANP) for their contributions and comments on this report.

This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and Conservación Amazónica – Peru (ACCA), with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation

Pacsi R, Novoa S, La Torre S, Balbuena H, Finer M, Santana A, Castillo H. (2026). Rapid Expansion of Illegal Gold Mining in Tambopata National Reserve (Southern Peruvian Amazon). MAAP:241.

 

MAAP #240: Expansion of illegal gold mining in the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon (part 2. Protected Areas)

Posted on by Matt Finer
Base Map. Mining sites in the Xingu Socio-environmental Diversity Corridor. Data: ACA/MAAP, ISA.

We present the second of a two-part series on illegal gold mining deforestation in the Xingu River Basin, located in the eastern Brazilian Amazon (states of Pará and Mato Grosso). The current report examines mining in protected areas of the Xingu, while Part 1 focused on Indigenous territories (see MAAP #239)

The Xingu Basin is the site of the largest historical concentration of gold mining deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (see MAAP #235). At the heart of this basin is the Xingu Socio-environmental Diversity Corridor, which is one of the largest continuous blocks (over 26 million hectares) of designated forests on the planet, connecting 24 Indigenous territories and 9 protected areas (see Base Map). Despite the official land designations, the area remains threatened, especially by the expansion of illegal gold mining driven by record high gold prices.

To address this challenge, the Xingu+ Network (Rede Xingu+) was created, a political alliance formed by a coalition of organizations representing the area. This network monitors deforestation and other pressures in the Xingu Corridor monthly, using the radar-based SiRAD X system. 

In 2025, the Xingu+ Network partnered with Amazon Conservation, facilitating access to high-resolution optical images (from Planet), allowing for validation of alerts and identification of drivers. This collaboration also incorporates the online public dashboard Amazon Mining Watch.

Both systems, SiRAD X and Amazon Mining Watch, have detected a major expansion of gold mining deforestation since 2018 in the Corridor, including continued illegal activity during 2025. Throughout the report, we present data for both systems, noting their slight differences due to varying methodologies (Note 1), but the overall patterns of both datasets are consistent. 

Between 2018 and 2024, the Sirad X monitoring system recorded the loss of around 11,500 hectares of forest within the Indigenous territories and protected areas of the Xingu Corridor (Amazon Mining Watch estimates around 16,000 ha), plus 400 hectares in 2025 (January – September), similar to the estimate of Amazon Mining Watch.

Both monitoring systems have detected recent mining deforestation in 6 protected areas in the Xingu Corridor (Note 2), in addition to the 5 Indigenous territories reported in part 1.

In Part 1, we detailed the recent gold mining deforestation in three of these Indigenous territories (Kuruaya, Baú, and Kayapó). 

Here, in part 2, we focus on the recent gold mining deforestation in three of these protected areas (Altamira National Forest, Terra do Meio Ecological Station, and Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve) in the Xingu Corridor, including the presentation of a series of high-resolution images.

The Base Map indicates the focal areas of this series, with Points A-C covered in the first report (Indigenous territories), and Points D-F in the current second report (protected areas). 

Mining in Protected Areas

Altamira National Forest

The Altamira National Forest (located in Pará state) is experiencing expanding illegal mining in three locations with notable increases in 2025. In just the first eight months of 2025, the area affected by illegal mining in the Altamira National Forest has already exceeded the total environmental damage recorded for the entire year of 2024, highlighting the urgent need for enforcement operations in the area.

Mining began in its northwestern and western sections between 2016 and 2018 and expanded 832 hectares by September 2025. Figure D1 shows recent mining deforestation in the western section, between October 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel). Although there are mining exploration applications for these sections, mining is not permitted in the area’s Management Plan or in its creation decree (Decree No. 2483, 1998). See Note 3 for comparison with AMW.

Figure D1 Data: Planet, NICFI

The mining in the southeastern section began in 2024 and expanded to a cumulative total of 36 hectares by October 2025, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring. Gold mining in the southeastern section accounted for 45.7% of the area deforested by mining operations in 2025 within the National Forest, with the peak of its expansion occurring in June. Figure D2 shows recent mining deforestation in this section, between September 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel). 

Figure D2 Data: Planet, NICFI

Terra do Meio Ecological Station

The Terra do Meio Ecological Station has emerged as a new mining front. First identified in September 2024, the mining rapidly expanded to a cumulative total of 30 hectares by the end of 2025, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring (see Note 4 for comparison with AMW). Figure E shows this expansion between December 2024 (left panel) and September 2025 (right panel).

Although the Terra do Meio Ecological Station faces other illegal activities, such as deforestation, the presence of illegal mining operations within its boundaries is particularly concerning. This case not only demonstrates how far the offenders have encroached on a strictly protected area, but also highlights their high level of operational capacities. This combination increases the risk that the activity will spread, causing environmental degradation in other parts of the protected area.

Figure E. Data: Planet, NICFI

Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve

The Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve is strategically located along the BR-163 highway in Pará. It is a strictly protected conservation area established by Decree No. – May 20, 2005, and is located between the municipalities of Altamira and Novo Progresso, in the Tapajós-Xingu interfluve, and adjacent to the Menkragnoti and Panará Indigenous Lands on its eastern boundary.

Illegal mining in the Biological Reserve began to expand, primarily starting in January 2025. At that time, the mining site—which had previously covered an area of two hectares—was the subject of a complaint filed in Official Letter No. 01/2025 by Rede Xingu+. In June, illegal mining in the Biological Reserve was reported again via Official Letter No. 15/2025, following an expansion of 18 ha, and in July, via Official Letter No. 18/2025, following a further expansion of 6.82 ha, totaling 26.82 ha.  

Two mining sites are located in the northeastern region of the Rebio, opened in November 2024 and March 2025, and another site in the eastern region, opened in June 2025. It is worth noting that the site in the eastern region was also the subject of a complaint in Official Letter No. 18/2025, as it is located on and causing pollution in a tributary of the Pitxatxá River, a river that borders the Menkragnoti Indigenous Territory and where six indigenous villages of the Kayapó people are located.

Illegal mining began in December 2024, expanding to a cumulative total of 19 hectares as of September 2025 across several locations in the protected area, according to the Xingu+ Network monitoring (see Note 5 for comparison with AMW).

Even after enforcement operations, gold mining activity continues to expand within the Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve. Figures 1 and 2 show the rapid mining-deforestation expansion up to November 2025, and Figure 3 shows the construction of a landing strip between July and August, providing access to the gold mines in the eastern region.

Figure F1 shows recent mining deforestation in the northeast part of the Biological Reserve, between December 2024 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).

Figure F1 Data: Planet, NICFI

Figure F2 shows recent mining deforestation in the eastern part of the Biological Reserve, between June 2025 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).

Figure F2 Data: Planet, NICFI

Figure F3 shows a new landing strip (opened in August 2025) in the eastern part of the Biological Reserve, between June 2025 (left panel) and November 2025 (right panel).

Figure F3 Data: Planet, NICFI

Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the information presented above (and the previous MAAP #239), it is clear that illegal mining in the Xingu basin is not an isolated activity. It has spread to both Indigenous territories and protected areas, with illegal activity advancing into new territories, indicating the existence of a support network that provides the operational capacity and infrastructure necessary for the activity. Illegal mining poses a direct threat to protected areas by both deforestation and the contamination of rivers through the use of mercury, which affect sensitive ecosystems and the populations that depend on these resources. 

Below, we propose a number of recommendations to Brazilian authorities with regards to: (i) the design of enforcement actions; (ii) monitoring and restoration (iii) traceability of gold supply chains.

(i) The design of enforcement actions; 

Isolated enforcement actions have not been sufficient to guarantee the long-term protection of Protected Areas. Therefore, it is essential to establish a strategy coordinated with other agencies to dismantle the logistical structure that operates and fuels illegal mining. Alongside this, the structuring of preventive measures is fundamental.

  • Establish permanent advanced bases (operated by government agencies such as ICMBio) in the most critical protected aeass, ensuring a constant presence to break the cycle of miners returning after eviction operations.
  • Focus on disabling airstrips and seizing heavy machinery (hydraulic excavators) within protected areas, coordinating with National Civil Aviation agency (ANAC) and National Oil, Petroleum and Biofuel Agency (ANP) to block clandestine airfields and fuel stations in the areas surrounding protected lands.
  • Strengthen oversight in the surroundings of protected areas to prevent legalized mining in nearby areas from serving as a front for illegal extraction within the boundaries of protected areas. This process would include the National Mining Agency (ANM), with oversight from other agencies.

(ii) Monitoring and restoration 

Strengthening surveillance and environmental recovery is essential to discourage the return of illegal miners.

  • Support management councils and associations of riverine and traditional populations in implementing surveillance protocols, recognizing the role of these communities in maintaining the integrity of sustainable-use protected areas.
  • Implement Degraded Area Recovery Plans (PRADs) focused on the revegetation of riparian forests and the containment of siltation caused by mining sediments.In federal areas, it would be ICMBio; in state conservation units, the Institute for Forest and Biodiversity Development of the State of Pará (IDEFLOR-Bio).

(iii) Traceability of gold supply chains.

Implement a data-cross-referencing system that automatically blocks the issuance of Electronic Fiscal Invoices (NF-e) for minerals whose declared origin overlaps with Protected Area polygons. Improve legislation regarding documentation of sourcing area in traceability mechanisms, making it more difficult to “launder” minerals illegally extracted from Protected Areas.

Notes

1. Methodology of monitoring systems

For Sirad X monitoring, radar images from the Sentinel-1 satellite are used, which are processed by a series of algorithms on the Google Earth Engine (GEE) platform, along with optical images from the Landsat-9 satellite (OLI-2 sensor) and Sentinel-2 satellite (MSI sensor). A team of analysts examines the monitored area, visually searching for anomalies in the produced images. Each deforestation polygon is evaluated based on its proximity to other areas of degradation and the history of the region, and, if necessary, people familiar with the location are contacted to confirm the deforestation. Field knowledge is fundamental for data validation.

For Amazon Mining Watch, the mine detector is an artificial neural network, which we train to discriminate mines from other terrain by feeding it hand-labeled examples of mines and other key features as they appear in Sentinel-2 satellite imagery. The network operates on square patches of data extracted from the Sentinel-2 L1C data product. Each pixel in the patch captures the light reflected from Earth’s surface in twelve bands of visible and infrared light. We average (median composite) the Sentinel data across a period of many months to reduce the presence of clouds, cloud shadow, and other transitory effects. During run time, the network assesses each patch for signs of recent mining activity, and then the region of interest is shifted by half a patch width for the network to make a subsequent assessment. This process proceeds across the entire region of interest.

2-5. Comparisons with Amazon Mining Watch

2. Altamira National Forest, Terra do Meio Ecological Station, Iriri State Forest, Riozinho do Anfrísio Extractive Reserve, Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve, and Rio Iriri Extractive Reserve.

3. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 620 hectares in Altamira National Forest between 2018 and 2025.

4. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 3 hectares in Terra do Meio Ecological between 2018 and 2025.

5. As a comparison, Amazon Mining Watch indicates the total mining deforestation of 51 hectares in Cachimbo Mountain Headwaters Biological Reserve between 2018 and 2025.

Acknowledgments 

This report is part of a series focusing on gold mining in the Amazon, through a strategic collaboration between Amazon Conservation and regional partners, with support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. In this case, we thank our partner Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) for leading this report.