MAAP #251: Transboundary illegal gold mining: Brazil (Puruê River) & Colombia (Puré River)

Figure 1. Base map of transboundary mining area Colombia-Brazil. Data: ACA/MAAP

*This transboundary report is in collaboration with the Field Museum of Natural History, as part of a Rapid Biological and Social Inventory of the Alto Rio Japurá e Puruê, coordinated by the Field Museum in partnership with 11 research organizations and Indigenous federations in Brazil.

In a recent report (MAAP #245), we revealed the increasing gold mining deforestation along the Puré River, which flows through the heart of Puré River National Park in the southeastern Colombian Amazon.

Specifically, we reported that this mining deforestation emerged in 2024, escalated in 2025, and impacted over 500 hectares by May 2026.

Here, we highlight that the Puré River crosses into the northwestern Brazilian Amazon and becomes the Puruê River, a tributary of the Japurá River, which eventually flows into the upper Amazon River (see Figure 1 – Base Map).

This remote, but threatened, Puré-Puruê River region is critically important due its extraordinary biodiversity and high carbon stocks, and is home to Indigenous communities, including Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (specifically, the Yurí and Passé). 

In this report, we present novel data for the gold mining deforestation along the entire Puré (Colombia) – Puruê (Brazil) River region as an important transboundary case study.

In summary, we documented the gold mining deforestation of 7,900 hectares between 2001 and 2026 in the Puré-Puruê River transboundary region. While we first detected mining on the Brazil side as early as 2001, 88% has occurred since 2022, indicating that mining in the area has been recently escalating. The vast majority of the mining (92%) has occurred on the Brazil side (Puruê River), but has recently encroached and increased on the Colombia side (Puré River).

Transboundary Gold Mining Deforestation (Graph)

Figure 2 indicates the gold mining deforestation along the Puruê River in Brazil (orange bars) and the Puré River in Colombia (yellow bars). 

We first detected mining deforestation in 2001 on the Brazil side, which then slowly increased over the next 20 years, reaching a cumulative total of 980 hectares by the end of 2021. 

There was then a major peak in mining deforestation on the Brazil side in 2022 and 2023 (4,130 hectares in just these two years). 

Starting in 2024, the mining deforestation also extended to the Colombia side. While lower than the previous peak years, the combined mining deforestation in both countries was  relatively high from 2024 to June 2026 (2,791 hectares during these three years). 

In total, we estimate the cumulative gold mining deforestation of 7,901 hectares in both countries, as of June 2026. Of this total, 92% (7,307 hectares) has occurred on the Brazil side (Puruê River), and 8% (594 hectares) on the Colombia side (Pure River).

Figure 2. Gold mining deforestation in study area. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Government Operations

In response to the increasing gold mining activity and deforestation, there have been a series of 7 recent government operations targeting illegal mining in both the Puruê and Puré Rivers (see purple lines in Figure 2).

Three of these operations have featured binational coordination between authorities in both countries, and four have been focused on just the Brazil side.

The first record of a binational operation took place in December 2023. While there was no mining deforestation in Colombia yet at this time, there were mining barges on the Puré River. 

There were then two major binational operations in 2025 (May and November), when the mining deforestation was escalating in Colombia. These operations were coordinated among Colombian entities—the Attorney General’s Office (via its Directorate for Specialized Crimes against the Environment), the Colombian Aerospace Force, and the Colombian National Army—and Brazilian entities—the Ministry of Defense, the Brazilian Army, the Federal Police, and ICMBio.

These operations appeared to have short term effectiveness, but then mining quickly returned. For example, following the May 2025 operation, the mining deforestation subsequently declined on the Colombia side in June and July 2025, but then spiked again by November.

Similarly, following the November 2025 operation, the mining deforestation subsequently declined in December 2025 and January 2026 on the Colombia side, but then started to rise again by March.

Transboundary Gold Mining Deforestation (Maps)

Figure 3. Gold mining deforestation in study areas. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Figure 3 illustrates the gold mining deforestation along the Puré-Puruê River in both Colombia and Brazil, respectively.

As noted above, we estimate the total gold mining deforestation of 7,901 hectares as of June 2026, with 92% on the Brazil side (Puruê River).

The initial mining deforestation of 980 hectares over the first 20 years (2001-2021) is indicated in yellow, the peak in 2022 and 2023 (4,130 ha) is indicated in orange, and the most recent period of 2024-June 2026 is in red (2,791 ha).

On the Brazil side, note the mining deforestation on the Puruê River extends from the confluence with the Japurá River all the way to the Colombian border, including up several southern tributaries. The mining extended to the Colombia side (Pure River) in 2024.

Given this vast area, the mining deforestation data is relatively difficult to visualize. To better highlight this data, below we zoom in on four representative areas (two in each country).

 

 

 

 

 

Zooms of gold mining deforestation

In each of the four zooms below, we show the mining deforestation data followed by a before/after panel of satellite imagery. See Boxes 1-4 in Figure 3 for the location of each zoom (two in each country).

Zoom 1: Puruê River (Brazil)

Zoom 2: Puruê River (Brazil)

Zoom 3: Pure River (Colombia)

Zoom 4: Pure River (Colombia)

Policy Implications

Above, we have documented an important case of Amazonian transboundary illegal gold mining in the remote border area between southeast Colombia and northeast Brazil.

On the Brazilian side (Puruê River), the scale and persistence of illegal gold mining point to a problem that can no longer be addressed through intermittent enforcement operations alone. Brazil accounts for the overwhelming majority of the mining-related deforestation documented in the Puré–Puruê corridor (92%; over 7,300 hectares), with impacts extending from the lower Puruê near its confluence with the Japurá to the Colombian border and into tributaries. The recent decline in the rate of new mining deforestation following government operations is important, but the repeated reappearance of mining activity demonstrates the need to complement enforcement with a long-term strategy for territorial protection, governance, and permanent monitoring.

On the Colombia side (Puré River), while the overall gold mining deforestation is less (8%, over 500 hectares), it is more recent and accelerating. In addition, all of the documented gold mining deforestation is taking place within Puré River National Park, a strictly protected area where land use is not designated for mining operations of any kind. Thus, we have documented nearly 600 hectares of illegal gold mining deforestation in the park between 2024 and mid 2026 (MAAP #245). It is worth noting that prior to the emergence of this deforestation, we reported the presence of more than 50 mining dredges along the course of the Puré River within the National Park in 2024 and 2025 (MAAP #228).

A central issue across both countries is the impact of illegal gold mining on Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation. Evidence from the broader Puré–Puruê landscape indicates that isolated peoples may circulate across a transboundary forest landscape rather than according to the administrative boundary between Brazil and Colombia. On the Colombian side, the Yurí and Passé are formally recognized and protected within Puré River National Park; on the Brazilian side, indications of isolated peoples require urgent investigation and precautionary protection by the competent authorities. Until their presence, patterns of movement, and territorial use can be more fully assessed, continued expansion of mining creates major risks of rights violations against Indigenous peoples derived from violent encounter, disease transmission, mercury contamination, displacement, and loss of access to essential territories and resources.

The impacts of mining also extend beyond the areas directly cleared for extraction and include mercury contamination. Mercury used in illegal gold mining enters the Puré-Puruê–Japurá aquatic system and creates risks for downstream populations whose food security, livelihoods, and health depend heavily on fish and other aquatic resources. Mining activity can likewise generate spillover pressures on neighboring protected areas, including the Juami-Japurá Ecological Station, and on Indigenous territories connected to the wider Japurá landscape. The policy response therefore needs to consider the Puruê not simply as a collection of illegal mining sites, but as part of a connected river and forest system in which environmental contamination, biodiversity loss, and territorial insecurity can be transmitted far downstream and beyond the immediate mining frontier.

It is important to note that Colombia instituted a total ban on mercury in 2023, building off an initial ban issued in 2013. This prohibition covers the import and export of mercury to and from the national territory. Despite the ban within Colombia, mercury is still heavily used for illegal gold mining in border zones, such as those examined in this report.

It is also important to note that the mining economy is increasingly intertwined with a broader security challenge. 

The municipalities of Japurá and Maraã, which serve as key logistical bases for people, fuel, equipment, and supplies moving toward mining areas, are seeing a growing presence of organized criminal factions. This convergence between illegal mineral extraction, river transportation networks, and organized crime raises the stakes well beyond environmental enforcement. It calls for sustained coordination among environmental, Indigenous affairs, public-security, and defense institutions, together with their Colombian counterparts. Protecting the Puré–Puruê corridor will ultimately require simultaneously disrupting the logistical and financial networks that sustain illegal mining, protecting downstream and neighboring populations and territories, and establishing durable territorial protections for one of the most remote and vulnerable areas of the Brazil–Colombia border.

In conclusion, as illegal Amazonian gold mining continues to expand along the remote Colombia-Brazil border, our findings indicate that binational law enforcement operations appear effective in the short term, yet illegal gold mining inevitably returns relatively quickly (within months). The challenge lies in implementing long-term strategies in a remote, binational region that is also impacted by organized crime and home to vulnerable isolated and uncontacted Indigenous groups. The overall challenge, therefore, lies in strengthening sustained efforts to build a mining prevention strategy, while also continuing to develop operational response capabilities and coordinate binational actions across the border region.

Coordinated government actions are key given that supplies, dredges, and mining infrastructure are provided by business operators from municipalities in Brazil—specifically Japurá (the urban center closest to this area), Maraã, and Jutaí. Furthermore, the river routes used to transport supplies and machinery also serve to move the gold extracted in these zones—from the Puré-Puruê river corridor, across the Japurá and Tefé rivers, and finally to the city of Manaus.

Finally, we note that Colombia has activated protection mechanisms (established in 2018) for the Puré River National Park in response to risk reports. More recently, the Ministry of the Interior issued an Early Warning (#1635) in August 2026, mandating a coordinated institutional response among the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Foreign Affairs; however, follow‑up has so far been limited to administrative coordination and inter‑agency meetings, without new operational deployments on the ground. Satellite monitoring continues to show incursions, with dozens of mining rafts and hundreds of hectares deforested inside protected areas. Although the system aims to guarantee the territorial integrity and isolation of the Yurí and Passé peoples through health contingency protocols, collaboration with neighboring indigenous groups, and coordination with local governments—while also relying on binational security operations with Brazil—the problem remains unresolved.

Overall, the appropriate legal tools are in place, yet the capacity to resolve the current situation hinges on the national government allocating funding and demonstrating the political will to implement measures on the ground, moving beyond legal formalities to an operational presence that effectively dismantles the illegal mining infrastructure along the border.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Field Museum of Natural History for its important contributions (co-designing and co-writing) to this report.

MAAP #250: Amazon Tipping Point – Where Are We? (2026 Update)

Figure 1. Amazon primary forest loss. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP, UMD.

It is often reported that the largest rainforest in the world, the Amazon, is rapidly approaching a tipping point.

Generally defined, this tipping point is where parts of the rainforest will convert into drier ecosystems due to disrupted precipitation patterns caused by increasing deforestation.

The Amazon uniquely generates much of its own rainfall by recycling water from its source in the east (Atlantic Ocean) all the way west to the Andes Mountains and beyond, in a phenomenon known as flying rivers (see MAAP #232 and the follow-up white paper). Thus, high deforestation in the eastern Amazon may lead to downwind impacts (reduced precipitation) in the western Amazon. Importantly, these flying rivers follow different pathways during the wet season (northern route) vs. the dry season (southern route), implying that the tipping point is not a uniform event across the Amazon biome, as some areas are more vulnerable to atmospheric moisture (flying rivers) disruptions than others.

The scientific literature indicates this tipping point could be triggered at around 25% Amazon forest loss, in conjunction with climate change impacts (see References).

In a previous report published in 2022 (MAAP #164), we reconstructed the likely extent of the original Amazon biome forest prior to European colonization, and then estimated accumulated total Amazon forest loss (through 2021). Based on this analysis, we estimated that 13.2% of the original Amazon biome primary forests were lost to deforestation and fires.

Here, for our 250th report, we update this estimate by incorporating forest loss data through 2025. From 2022 to 2025 we found an additional forest loss of 13 million hectares, including the record-breaking year of 2024 for fires. Our updated estimate is that 15% of the original Amazon biome primary forest has been lost, mostly due to deforestation and fires (Figure 1).

In addition, breaking the results by seasonal moisture flow routes (see Figure 3 below), we find that moisture flows during the dry and transition seasons are most affected and disrupted (9.1% and 8.6% forest loss, respectively). This finding is critical because during the critical dry and transition seasons, the role of forest-driven moisture recycling is especially important to maintain rainforests in the southwest Amazon. In contrast, we find that the wet season moisture flow is more intact, with just 3.2% total forest loss.

Original Amazon Forest

As first presented in MAAP #164, we merged several datasets to estimate the extent of the original Amazon forest (Figure 2). We define this original forest as the extent of the Amazon forest before European colonization (and thus may include changes from pre-European indigenous populations). Note that we use a broader biogeographical definition of the Amazon that covers nine countries (Amazon biome) rather than the strict Amazon watershed (see Methodology).

The map has just three classes: Original Amazon forest, Original non-forest (such as natural savannah), and Water. 

We found that the original Amazon primary forest covered 647.6 million hectares (equivalent to 1.6 billion acres).

Of this total, 61.4% occurred within the current border of Brazil, followed by Peru (12%), Colombia (7%), Venezuela (6%), and Bolivia (5%). The remaining four countries (Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana) make up the final 8%.

Figure 2. Original Amazon biome forest. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP. Source MAAP#164.

Amazon Forest Loss

In MAAP #164, we reported the historical accumulated Amazon primary forest loss, as of the end of 2021. We documented the total loss of 85.5 million hectares, or 13.2% of the original Amazon.

For this report, we updated the data as of the end of 2025. This data is broken down into three time periods:

By 2000, we estimate that the original Amazon forest had lost 36 million hectares (MAAP #164).

The 2001-2021 estimate of primary forest cover loss was reduced from 49.5 million to 48 million hectares due to adjustments in the forest loss methodology used by the University of Maryland (UMD). It is important to highlight that this finding includes forest loss from both fire (7.3M ha) and non-fire (40.7M ha) causes, and does not include forest gain/regeneration.

A novel 2022-2025 estimate was generated based on the most recent UMD data, adding 13.04 million hectares, including the record-breaking year of 2024 that was mainly driven by forest fires following the strong El Niño event of 2023 (see MAAP #229 and #248). Similarly, this includes forest loss from both fire (5.43M ha) and non-fire (7.61M ha) causes. This total loss over just four years is the equivalent size of the US state of Louisiana.

Combining these three periods gives an updated total of 97.06 million hectares lost (equivalent to 240 million acres). This includes forest loss from both fire (12.78 M ha) and deforestation (84.28 M ha) causes.

The largest loss occurred in Brazil (79.4%), followed by Bolivia (6.2%),  Peru (5.8%), Colombia (4.5%), Venezuela (1.7%), Guyana (0.8%), Ecuador (0.7%), Suriname (0.6%), and French Guiana (0.2%).

Taking this updated forest loss total of 97.06 million hectares in relation to the original 647.6 million hectares gives our key finding of 15% of the original Amazon forest lost, mostly due to deforestation and fire (Figure 1). This estimate also includes natural causes such as landslides and windstorms.  

Figure 3 further illustrates the results broken down by seasonal moisture flow routes (as presented in MAAP #232). We found the transition season moisture flow is most threatened and impacted (9.1% total forest loss), followed by the dry season moisture flow (8.6%).

This finding is important because during the critical dry and transition seasons, the role of flying rivers to carry moisture to water-stressed forest in the southwest Amazon is especially important. In other words, extensive deforestation in the eastern and central parts of these pathways could negatively impact the downwind western part, which means that the tipping point event is not a single and homogenous one across the Amazon biome and there will be geographical areas that will be impacted sooner and harder.

In contrast, we find that the wet season moisture flow is more intact, with just 3.2% total forest loss.

Figure 3. Amazon forest loss in flying rivers pathways. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP

Methodology

At the core of this work, we generated two major estimates: original Amazon forest and total historical Amazon forest loss.

For both of these estimates, we used the biogeographical boundary of the Amazon (as determined by RAISG 2020), which encompasses nine countries. Thus, we used a broader definition of the Amazon (Amazon biome) rather than the strict Amazon watershed, which omits part of the northeastern Amazon biome.

As presented in MAAP #164, for original Amazon forest, we defined three major classes: Forest, Non-Forest, and Water. This analysis was based on data from MapBiomas Brazil (collection 2 from 1990) with some additional modifications. As noted above, we define this original forest as the extent of the Amazon forest before European colonization (and thus may include changes from pre-European indigenous populations).

Original Forest was made up of these MapBiomas categories: Forest Formation, Mangrove, Flooded Forest, Mosaic of Agriculture and Pasture. Non-Forest was made up of these MapBiomas categories: Savanna Formation, Natural Non-Forest Flood Formation, Grassland, and Other non-Forest Formations. Water was made up of these MapBiomas categories: River, Lake, Ocean and Glacier. 

We then made a number of modifications with manual edits based on data from the University of Maryland, INPE (Terrabrasilis), ArcGis satellite images, Planet mosaics, Google Earth Engine Landsat images from 1984-1990, and official government data for several countries (Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador (MAE) and Peru (GeoBosques/MINAM), Forest and Carbon Monitoring System/IDEAM of Colombia, National Institute for Space Research of Brazil (INPE/Terrabrasilis), General Directorate of Forest Management and Development of Bolivia (DGGDF), and the National Service of Protected Areas of Bolivia (SERNAP). As an example of a major modification, deforested areas and historic dam reservoirs were changed to Original Forest based on an analysis of the oldest available satellite image for the area (1984-1990). We also corrected some misclassifications, such as forest patches in clearly non-forest areas were changed to Non-Forest (and vice versa) and mountain forest areas found as water were changed to Forest. Also, agriculture and urban areas in likely savannah areas were changed to Non-Forest. Additional Water data from MapBiomas based on 1985 was incorporated. Overall, our focus was defining Original Forest as best as possible; data confusions between Non-Forest and Water categories were not worked on as thoroughly. 

For original Amazon forest,For total historical Amazon forest loss, we used data from the University of Maryland. Specifically, we first used their data layer ‘Tree Cover 2000″ (>30% canopy density) to estimate historical (pre-2000) forest loss.

We then used the Global Forest Change (GFC) and Global forest loss due to fire datasets developed by the University of Maryland (UMD) for the period 2001–2025. We then derived annual forest loss from the loss year layer of GFC. Subsequently, we separated fire-related from non-fire-related forest loss using the annual Global forest loss due to fire dataset. Areas classified with medium to high certainty of fire attribution (codes 3 and 4) were considered fire-related forest loss, whereas codes 1 and 2 were used to identify non-fire-related forest loss, representing areas of forest loss attributed to other drivers. This classification was applied to minimize potential overestimation of fire-related forest loss. All data processing and analyses were conducted using Google Colaboratory.

It is important to note that for the more modern post-2000 era (2001-25), data is available for forest loss due to both fire and non-fire causes. This data represents our best estimate or proxy for primary forest loss.  Non-fire loss can be considered more permanent, such as deforestation, while fire loss may be considered more as degradation. The results above combine both types of data to be consistent with the original results presented in MAAP #164.

It is also important to note that our estimates do not include forest gain/regeneration.

Finally, we estimate the amount of primary forest loss in the major seasonal moisture flow pathways (wet, dry, and transition seasons), as presented in  MAAP #232.

References

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Hansen, M. C. et. al. (2013) High-Resolution Global Maps of 21st-Century Forest Cover Change. Science 342.

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Turubanova S., Potapov P., Tyukavina, A., and Hansen M. (2018) Ongoing primary forest loss in Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia. Environmental Research Letters.

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Berenguer E. et. al. (2021) Ch 19. Drivers and ecological impacts of deforestation and forest degradation. In: Nobre C, Encalada et al. (Eds). Amazon Assessment Report 2021. United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, USA. Available from https://www.theamazonwewant.org/spa-reports

Hirota M et. al (2021) Science Panel for the Amazon, Ch 24. Resilience of the Amazon Forest to Global Changes: Assessing the Risk of Tipping Points. In: Nobre C, Encalada et al. (Eds). Amazon Assessment Report 2021. United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, USA. Available from https://www.theamazonwewant.org/spa-reports/

Wunderling et al (2022) Recurrent droughts increase risk of cascading tipping events by outpacing adaptive capacities in the Amazon rainforest. PNAS 119 (32) e2120777119.

Acknowlegments

This work was supported by NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).

Citation

Finer M, Mamani N, Ariñez A, Castillo H (2026) Amazon Tipping Point – Where Are We? (2026 Update).