August 2026

MAAP #249: Gold Mining Deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Napo Province (Southern Zone)

Posted on August 24, 2026August 24, 2026 by Matt Finer

Image 1. Mining activity along the banks of the Anzu River, Napo, Ecuador. Source: EcoCiencia 2026.

In a previous report (MAAP #230, published in July 2025), we presented an initial assessment of gold mining deforestation in the southern part of Napo province, located in the central region of the Ecuadorian Amazon near the city of Tena.

This analysis was particularly relevant given that Napo had emerged as one of the Ecuadorian Amazonian provinces most impacted by escalating gold mining deforestation and contamination, threatening its primary Amazon forests, important watersheds, and key conservation areas (Image 1).

That report concluded that gold mining expanded rapidly between 2017 and 2024, affecting 1,741 hectares across four zones, with 19% of that area located outside of mining concessions.

In response to this situation, the Ecuadorian government temporarily suspended mining activities in Napo province in early February 2026, aiming to curb illegal extraction, mitigate its environmental impacts, and protect Amazonian water sources. By mid-February, however, local community members were reporting the resumption of mining activities despite the suspension in effect. These operations reportedly took place primarily at night, highlighting the challenges involved in ensuring effective control and compliance with the measures adopted by the authorities.

Here, we update the analysis by incorporating the most recent satellite imagery through 2025 and the first half of 2026.

In summary, based on an updated analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery, we reveal the gold mining deforestation of 2,321 hectares across 5 active mining zones in the southern Napo province between 2017 and early 2026. Of this total, 580 hectares of new mining impact happened in the most recent time period of 2025 to early 2026. In fact, we added the fifth mining zone (Río Napo-Sindy) not in our previous reporting as it just emerged in 2025.

Below, in a series of case studies, we examine each of the 5 major mining zones with a collection of maps and images, including new drone imagery to show the mining impacts in very high resolution.

Gold mining deforestation in Napo province (southern zone)

Graph 1. Mining activity (2014–2024), southern Napo. Data: MapBiomas Ecuador-EcoCiencia.

To evaluate recent trends of gold mining deforestation in the southern part of Napo province, we first analyzed annual data available from 2014–2024 (MapBiomas Ecuador).

The results demonstrate a sustained increase in mining activity in the two municipalities covering this area (Tena and Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola).

Specifically, we found that mining deforestation showed a marked acceleration starting in 2018, exceeding 1,600 hectares by 2024 (Graph 1)—an area more than nine times larger than that recorded at the beginning of the analysis (190 hectares in 2014).

Satellite monitoring update

To add to the annual (2014-2024) data noted above, we analyzed recent high-resolution satellite imagery (Planet) across the 5 major areas of gold mining deforestation in the southern section of Napo province (see Base Map). It is worth noting that the fifth area (Río Napo-Sindy) was not in our previous reporting as it just emerged in 2025.

We first reported that between 2017 and 2024, gold mining deforestation impacted 1,741 hectares (MAAP #230). Updating the data for 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, we added 580 hectares of new mining impact. Thus, for the full satellite monitoring period of January 2017 to March 2026, we estimate the total gold mining deforestation of 2,321 hectares in this region of southern Napo province.

Base Map. Satellite monitoring area in Napo. Data: Amazon Conservation/MAAP; EcoCiencia; Planet.

Case 1: Jatunyacu  River

The study area is located along the Jatunyacu River—one of the headwaters of the Napo River and a zone of intense mining activity within Napo Province. Between January 2017 and January 2024, the identified mining expansion affected 502 hectares (Map 1, yellow). This update shows that the trend has continued, with a cumulative deforested area of 561 hectares recorded by the first quarter of 2026. The recent increase of 59 hectares is indicated on the map by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026). Of the total recorded, approximately 2% corresponds to mining activity carried out outside the boundaries of the current mining cadastre (indicated in purple).

Map 1. Satellite monitoring, Case 1: Jatunyacu River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Map 1A. Mining activity identified via drone flights. Data: EcoCiencia; Planet.

Located within this area is the Yutzupino sector near Tena, considered an emblematic case of illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon due to the scale of the identified operations and the recurring enforcement interventions by the authorities (MAAP #151).

Given the important relevance of this area, we incorporated drone imagery (obtained in July 2026) into the analysis, allowing for a more detailed observation of the mining impacts.

Map 1A shows the drone imagery of the Yutzupino area, revealing the mining deforestation, alteration of the soil and watercourses, and the formation of mining pools.

Case 2: Anzu River

This case is located along the Anzu River (another headwater of the Napo River) and its tributaries. Satellite monitoring previously documented that, between January 2017 and January 2024, mining expansion in the analyzed area affected 635 hectares (Map 2, yellow). This update shows that the cumulative deforested area reached 806 hectares by the first quarter of 2026. The recent increase of 171 hectares is indicated by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026) on the map. In addition, we identified that 13% of the total area affected by mining corresponds to activity carried out outside the mining cadastre (indicated in purple).

Map 2. Satellite monitoring Case 2: Anzu River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Drone imagery from July 2026 reveals additional impacts associated with mining activity, including deforestation, sedimentation ponds, eroded soils, as well as mining camps and machinery (Image 2B).

Image 2B. Mining activity identified via drone flights. Data: EcoCiencia;

We also identified the construction of berms (raised barriers) intended to control soil erosion during extraction activities. These structures, however, can also divert natural river channels. Image 2C clearly shows the location of these structures and the proximity of mining activities to the riverbanks, which could directly impact the river. The image also provides a more detailed view of the forest loss, sedimentation ponds, and soil erosion.

Image 2C. 3D aerial photograph obtained via drone. Data: EcoCiencia.

This area also has cultural importance due to the presence of a petroglyph (prehistoric carving) registered in the Ecuadorian Cultural Heritage Information System. Local monitoring has revealed interventions in the vicinity of the petroglyph—including rock removal and modification of the surrounding area—apparently linked to mining activities (Image 2D). Although no direct damage to the carving was observed, given that it is an archaeological asset protected by national legislation, any direct or indirect impact resulting from extractive activities could constitute a violation of heritage protection regulations.

Image 2D. Location and surrounding impacts on the petroglyph in the Anzu River. Data: EcoCiencia; Planet.

Case 3: Huambuno River

Along the Huambuno River, a northern tributary of the Napo River, we documented the mining deforestation of 492 hectares between May 2017 and January 2024 (Map 3, yellow). The updated analysis shows that the mining deforestation reached 674 hectares by the first quarter of 2026. This recent increase of 182 hectares is indicated by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026) on the map. In addition, we determined that nearly a quarter (23%) of total mining activity has occurred outside the official mining cadastre (shown in purple).

Map 3. Satellite monitoring Case 3: Huambuno. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Case 4: Puní-Cotona-Arajuno Rivers

In this network of southern tributaries to the Napo River, we documented the mining deforestation of 112 hectares between May 2017 and January 2024 (Map 4, yellow). The updated data reveals that this impact has risen to 234 hectares by early 2026. This recent increase of 122 hectares is indicated on the map by the colors orange (2025) and red (2026). Importantly, we found that nearly all (99%) of the mining deforestation has occurred outside areas covered by mining concessions in the official registry (indicated in purple).

Map 4. Satellite monitoring Case 4: Puní-Cotona-Arajuno. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Case 5: Napo River – Sindy Zone

The important new case represents a mining area that mostly emerged and escalated in 2025. It is located along a stretch of the upper Napo River (just downstream of the Jatunyacu and Anzu headwaters), near the communities of Sindy and San Carlos. The initial mining deforestation of 6 hectares was first detected in the Sindy River tributary in 2023 and 2024 (Map 5, yellow). In 2025, the activity shifted to the banks of the mainstem Napo River, impacting 47 hectares by early 2026 (orange and red on the map). Importantly, the vast majority (94%) of this mining deforestation has occurred outside the zones listed in the mining registry (indicated in purple). Both small-scale and larger-scale operations (with specialized machinery and industrial sorting plants) have been identified in this area.

Map 5: Satellite monitoring – Case 5: Napo-Sindy River. Data: EcoCiencia, Planet.

Image 5b shows the rapid increase in mining deforestation between January 2025 (left panel) and March 2026 (right panel) in this area.

Image 5B: Mining deforestation along Napo River, Ecuador. Data: Planet, EcoCiencia.

Image 5C shows drone imagery obtained in July 2026. Notable impacts include deforestation, sedimentation ponds, soil erosion, and the use of heavy machinery.

Image 5C. Drone imagery over Sindy zone. Data: EcoCiencia.

Public policy recommendations for the Napo River basin

1. Implement an inter-institutional monitoring and compliance system

We recommended implementing an inter-institutional monitoring and compliance system for the Napo River basin that integrates remote monitoring via satellite imagery and drones, strategic enforcement operations, community-based surveillance mechanisms, and a public tracking framework for the measures adopted. This policy would strengthen effective compliance with the suspension ordered in February 2026, prevent the resumption of unauthorized extractive activities, and ensure the protection of water resources and associated ecosystems. and early warning systems. We also call for early warning systems that enable the timely detection of new invasions within protected areas and Indigenous territories

2. Establishment of a river buffer protection zone

The proximity of mining activities to rivers and streams is a primary driver of degradation for Amazonian aquatic ecosystems, resulting from deforestation, alteration of watercourses, increased erosion and sedimentation, and mercury contamination. Given that the suspension order of February 2026 acknowledges river impacts from mining, it is essential to strengthen water resource protection measures through proactive land-use management.

In this context, we recommended that the Ministry of Environment and Energy—in coordination with the National Water Authority and the relevant mining sector entities—delineate and enforce a mining exclusion zone at least 100 meters wide along each bank of rivers, streams, and other surface water bodies within the Amazonian Territorial Circumscription, in accordance with the water protection criteria established by national legislation. Note that MAAP #191 previoulsy called for riparian protection zones that extend at least 500 meters on each side of the river.

Furthermore, we recommend that this protection zone be incorporated into processes for land-use planning, granting of mining authorizations, and oversight of extractive activities, complemented by geospatial monitoring mechanisms, periodic inspections, and early warning systems.

3. Implement a system for the traceability and control of machinery used in mining activities

The persistence of illegal mining activities in the Napo River basin highlights the need to strengthen control mechanisms regarding the machinery used for mineral extraction and processing. The movement and operation of excavators, sorting machines, dredges, pumps, and other equipment serve as a key indicator of the expansion of mining activities and their potential impact on aquatic ecosystems.

We recommend the establishment of a mining machinery traceability system for the Amazon region, coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Mining Regulation and Control Agency (ARCOM), decentralized autonomous governments, and competent oversight bodies.

4. Strengthening Cultural Heritage Management

We recommend strengthening the protection, monitoring, and conservation of petroglyphs and other archaeological heritage assets located in areas where extractive activities take place, through early risk identification, the demarcation and signage of protection zones, inter-institutional coordination, and the implementation of preventive measures to ensure the integrity of these sites and their cultural settings.

This recommendation includes the mandatory inclusion of heritage protection criteria in the processes for the regularization, control, and monitoring of mining activities, as well as the implementation of periodic inspections, awareness-raising programs for mining operators, and coordination mechanisms among environmental, mining, and cultural heritage authorities.

This recommendation is based on Ecuador’s Constitution (Articles 379 and 380), which recognizes archaeological assets as part of the nation’s cultural heritage and establishes the State’s obligation to guarantee their identification, protection, conservation, and safeguarding. Any adverse impact on these assets must be sanctioned in accordance with the law.

Additionally, this recommendation is grounded in the Organic Law on Culture, which regulates the protection and conservation of heritage assets, and in the Comprehensive Organic Penal Code (Article 239), which penalizes the forgery, substitution, or adulteration of cultural heritage assets—including alterations affecting the nature or original engravings of archaeological elements such as petroglyphs.

5. Additional recommendations from the previous report

In addition to the above new recommendations, we also summarize the proposals made in the previous report focused on the southern zone of Napo province (MAAP #230), all of which are still valid. See the full report (specifically, the “Recommendations for public policy” at the end) for a detailed description and legal basis for these recommendations.

Strengthen the investigation and oversight processes of mining activities taking place outside of mining concessions.
Apply administrative sanctions to the mining concessionaires who fail to report illicit activities within their authorized area.
Strictly apply criminal sanctions to those who carry out mining extraction activities outside authorized areas, as established by Ecuador’s Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code.
Define mining exclusion zones at least 100 meters wide along each bank of rivers and their tributaries—as established by the Regulations to the Law on Water Resources, Uses, and Water Utilization of Ecuador.
Establish an environmental reclassification requiring an environmental licensing process—including an environmental impact study and a public participation process—for the opening of new roads.
Request that Decentralized Autonomous Governments include water protection zones and mandatory ecological easements within their Development and Land-Use Planning Plans and Land Use and Management Plans.
Establish a binding protection system and management categories for rivers with exceptional natural and cultural values, based on the implementation of water protection zones with a participatory management plan.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Ecuadorian Rivers Institute for its contributions to this report.

This report is part of a series focused on the Ecuadorian Amazon, resulting from a strategic collaboration between the organizations EcoCiencia Foundation (Fundación EcoCiencia) and Amazon Conservation, with the support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.

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MAAP #248: Implications of upcoming major El Niño event on Amazon fires

Posted on August 17, 2026August 17, 2026 by Matt Finer

Figure 1. El Niño 2023. Data: Google Gemini

In our annual series on forest loss trends in the Amazon (MAAP #244 & MAAP #229), we observed that the two most recent intense fire seasons, 2016 and 2024, immediately followed major El Niño events.

For example, extreme drought conditions created by a strong El Niño in late 2023 created extreme drought conditions the following year, enabling widespread fires across the Amazon in 2024. In contrast, the reduced fires of 2025 were associated with the moister conditions of La Niña.

For background, the definition of El Niño is based on warm sea surface temperature in a specific zone of the Pacific Ocean several hundred kilometers off the coast of South America (Figure 1).

Specifically, a Sea Surface Temperature Anomaly (SSTA) above 0.5 degrees Celsius in the El Niño 3.4 Zone is classified as an El Niño event (See Methods section for details). Anomalies above 1 degree C are a moderate event, and above 2 degrees C, a very strong event.

We took this SSTA data annually from 2002 to 2025 for the 3-month period of October-November-December, which typically correlates with peak temperature anomalies.

We then analyzed this data in relation to the following year’s fire-caused primary forest loss (data from the University of Maryland). We focused the analysis on years with at least a weak El Niño (SSTA > 0.5).

Results

Figure 2. El Niño and Amazon Fires. Data: UMD, NOAA

Filtering the dataset for El Niño years (SSTA > 0.5 degrees C) isolates 8 specific historical events (2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2018, and 2023).

Of these events:

Four were Weak El Niño (SSTA 0.5- 0.9): 2004, 2006, 2014, and 2018;

Two were Moderate (SSTA 1.0 – 1.4): 2002, 2009;

One was Strong (SSTA 1.5 to 1.9): 2023;

And one was Very Strong (SSTA ≥ 2.0): 2015.

To analyze the delayed (lagged) impact, the SSTA from each year (Year t) is paired directly with the Fire Primary Forest Loss Area from the following year (Year t+1).

See Figure 2 for the visual correlation between El Niño events (blue) and primary forest loss from fires (red).

Note the initial observation that prompted this study: the major peak in fires in 2016 following the Very Strong El Niño of 2015, followed by the record-breaking fire season in 2024 following the Strong El Niño of 2023.

Despite a limited sample size (only 8 El Niño events since 2000) and limited statistical power, the analysis reveals a clear, strong positive relationship between the strength of El Niño events (that is, magnitude of the sea surface temperature anomaly) and the severity of the following fire season.

The strength of this relationship approaches the traditional margin of statistical significance (probability value under 0.05), with a probability value of 0.08 (see the Annex for details).

Thus, the data do indicate a potential escalating relationship between El Niño and Amazon fires.

Most notably, the two highest sea surface temperature anomalies —2015 (+2.34) and 2023 (+1.49)—directly preceded the two largest fire seasons, 2016 (1.76 million hectares) and 2024 (2.79 million hectares), respectively.

Low-tier warm anomalies (like +0.52 or +0.73) correspond to lagged fire sizes under 160,000 hectares.

Discussion

As detailed above, the available data indicates a strong positive correlation between the severity of El Niño events and the intensity of the Amazon fire season the following year.

This correlation is anchored by two key events that prompted this analysis in the first place: the peak fire season in 2016 following the Very Strong El Niño of 2015; and the record-breaking fire season in 2024 (see MAAP #229) following the Strong El Niño of 2023.

There is currently an urgency regarding these findings due to the predicted Very Strong El Niño event (that is, SSTA > 2 degrees C) in late 2026 and implications for the 2027 fire season. Some predictions have the SSTA as the highest on record, even approaching 3 degrees C by November to December 2026.

The current SSTA (for May-June-July 2026) is +0.98 degrees C (Weak to Moderate El Niño), rapidly coming out of last year’s La Niña phase, and warming fast.

Thus, the best recent analogue is the Very Strong El Niño of 2015, and the subsequent burning of nearly 1.8 million hectares of primary Amazon forest the following year in 2016. The most recent analogue is 2023 (see Figure 1), and the subsequent record-breaking fire season of 2024.

We also raise the possibility that the impact on fires carries over to a second year following a major El Niño – this could account for the severe fire seasons of 2017 (1 million hectares) and 2025 (1.5 million hectares).

The weaker El Niño years show a consistent directional pattern but without the same magnitude response.

We also note a major structural break in the data: in general, fires are much greater starting in 2016 (average fire area pre-2016: ~150k ha; Post-2016: ~1.0M ha). This time frame slightly precedes, overlaps, and then continues after the President Bolsonaro administration (2019-2023), which weakened illegal deforestation enforcement policies. Thus, there may be a new modern elevated baseline of fire activity in the Brazilian Amazon.

Since El Niño typically peaks in November to December, which corresponds to the onset of the wet (monsoon) season, the mechanism for this correlation may be shutting down the convection engine driving the rainy season. The disruption of the wet season moisture flow could extend the dry and transition seasons, reducing precipitation, creating drier conditions, and preventing the soil from recovering its moisture, setting up the Amazon for an intense fire season.

It is worth noting that another recent study found that the years with the largest burned areas in the Peruvian Amazon between 2013 and 2024 coincide with the occurrence of El Niño events and drought conditions (Reference 10).

How ready are Amazonian countries for the upcoming 2027 El Niño fire season?

Experience of 2024

The 2023 El Niño and subsequent 2024 fire season exposed the depth of the preparedness gap across the Amazon basin. The responses that emerged were largely reactive, deployed well into a crisis that monitoring systems had anticipated months earlier. Brazil, Peru, and especially Bolivia were most affected among the Amazonian countries, and this review of institutional preparedness focuses on these three countries. Drier conditions created by El Niño, however, created an increased fire risk across the entire biome, affecting all countries.

Brazil mounted the most substantial national response, though it arrived belatedly. By August 2024 — almost three months since the wildfires started — a state of emergency was decreed in 45 municipalities and 48 Brazilian cities were put on high alert (Reference 1). In the end, fires directly impacted 1.9 million hectares, the highest on record (MAAP #229).

Peru also declared a national emergency during the 2024 crisis, unlocking emergency coordination powers and international assistance. In the end, however, fires impacted 47,574 hectares, more than double the previous high (MAAP #229).

Bolivia also had its worst fire season on record in 2024, as fires directly impacted 779,960 hectares, far surpassing the previous record (MAAP #229). The main cause of deforestation and subsequent fires was likely agrarian speculation. Two supreme decrees in 2024 granted zero tariffs and tax incentives to agribusiness, which triggered a surge in demand for land for monocultures of soy, sugarcane, and seed oils. This expansion was supported by existing regulations that expedite the clearing of up to 20 hectares. The government declared a national emergency and later a national disaster, but the response was hampered by weak enforcement: Bolivia’s fines for illegal forest burning (under $20/hectare) are roughly 2% of Brazil’s, and tensions between national and local government further slowed emergency coordination. To contain the disaster, the government declared an Ecological Environmental Pause, which suspended burning permits and placed the burned public lands under quarantine for five years. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ special rapporteur documented how tensions between national and local governments hindered emergency responses, while policies aimed at aggressively expanding industrial agriculture had dried out large areas of the country, leaving ecosystems vulnerable to fire.

Changes implemented in 2025

Fire impact was much lower in 2025 relative to 2024 (1.5 million vs 2.8 million hectares of primary forest burned, respectively) (MAAP #244). Several Amazonian countries implemented stronger fire management policies in response to the 2024 fire season. The reduced burnt area, however, cannot be solely attributed to better institutional preparedness, as climate conditions were also more favorable, with La Niña bringing relief through higher humidity levels across the biome.

In February 2025, Brazil’s Environment Minister Marina Silva decreed a pre-emptive environmental emergency ahead of the fire season, giving authorities extra powers and resources to contain wildfires before they spread. The federal government committed to hiring an additional 250 federal firefighters and allocated 45 million reais to bolster state-level fire brigades across six Amazonian states (Reference 3). Other structural measures followed: Brazil’s Supreme Court ordered the federal government and all Amazon and Pantanal states to draw up emergency fire management plans, while the Ministry of Environment announced “governance offices” in 70 Amazon municipalities — supported by FUNBIO and UNDP — to provide vehicles, boats, drones, and training for fire prevention (Reference 4). The Prevfogo program, managed by IBAMA, was expanded as a platform integrating satellite-based detection with ground response. These combined efforts contributed to a measurable decline in fire activity in 2025 compared with the previous year (MAAP #244).

In Peru, in response to the 2024 events, the Ministry of Environment proposed a Forest Fire Prevention and Control Law to establish regional firefighting brigades and prohibit land-use change in areas affected by wildfires, though recent amendments to the Forest Law (Law No. 31973) may undermine this approach (Reference 5). Seven of Peru’s 24 regions have published forest fire prevention and risk reduction plans, and a Multisectoral Plan for Wildfire Response 2025–2027 is currently being developed, drawing on risk assessments that classify nearly 20% of national territory as high or very high fire risk.

In Bolivia, the legislative trajectory since 2024 has moved in the opposite direction. Agribusiness lobbies have pressured to roll back burning fines, and a land reform that would have accelerated deforestation in Santa Cruz and Beni, the departments that burned most severely in 2024, was enacted in the first half of 2026, and then repealed in the face of social protests (Reference 6). The country has been navigating its worst economic and political crisis in decades, and institutional preparedness for the 2027 fire season could be severely challenged under these conditions.

In terms of regional cooperation, the most significant recent development is the Operational Understanding for Preparedness and Response, approved by ACTO member countries in early 2026. This non-binding regional cooperation framework establishes mechanisms for coordinating mutual assistance among Amazonian countries when the magnitude of forest fires requires a joint response, facilitating the articulation of national capacities, exchange of operational information, and technical support during fire-related emergencies. Concurrent with its adoption, member countries agreed to establish the Forest Fire Response Committee (CRIF), a regional body tasked with developing technical instruments, operational procedures, and coordination mechanisms to improve preparedness and joint response (Reference 7).

In conclusion, the reduction in burnt area observed across the three countries in 2025 occurred under favorable climate conditions, which, as our analysis shows, are unlikely to be seen in 2027. The true test of institutional preparedness will come under El Niño-driven stress. The regional architecture, meanwhile, can only perform as well as its weakest national link. Under a degraded political landscape and without policy improvements since 2024, Bolivia could become the epicenter of the 2027 fire season.

Outlook for 2026 – 2027

From the FAO’s El Niño Fire Readiness checklist (Reference 8), there are five major components of readiness for next year’s 2027 fire season.

First is “Fire Awareness”, which includes understanding historical trends that distinguish an average season from an anomaly season, and what drives major fires (such as fuel load from recently deforested areas) that could be incorporated into Risk Reduction strategies.

As noted above, annual MAAP reports (MAAP #229, MAAP #244) provide historical trends for the Amazon regarding fire impact to primary forests. These reports allow for the identification of intense, or anomalous, fire seasons (such as 2024).

In terms of what drives major fires, previous MAAP reports have revealed the tight link between deforestation and fires in the Amazon (MAAP #189). That is, most major fires are burning recently deforested areas, and then may escape into surrounding forests, especially with extended dry conditions such as 2016 and 2024. For example, over 70% of major fires in the Brazilian Amazon burn recently deforested areas (MAAP #189). There is also a strong link between deforestation and fire in the Bolivian Amazon, where deforestation also often precedes fires, which may then escape into surrounding forests or savannahs.

Thus, one of the key strategies to minimize major fires in 2027 is to minimize new deforestation in 2026.

Second is the establishment of “Fire Danger Rating and Early Warning” systems and the provision of this information to stakeholders.

As the El Niño intensifies throughout 2026, this could include the monitoring of moisture or drought conditions and issuing respective warnings.

Third is “Fire Preparedness,” and includes guidance for prevention, detection, and suppression of fires based on the above rating and warning system.

In terms of prevention, fire-free agricultural practices could be promoted in 2026 and more strictly enforced in 2027, coordinating closely with local rural unions and cooperatives (Reference 9). Local community initiatives represent a critical component of this preparedness, serving as tangible examples of prevention, detection, and suppression mechanisms.

For instance, the Territorial Strengthening Actions implemented across the Amazon basin demonstrate this integrated approach: communities in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador are actively developing local capacities for fire detection, sustainable management (safe fire use) and early response, while promoting alternative practices to slash-and-burn agriculture.

This community-based approach is further strengthened by broader regional efforts, such as the CoRAmazonia program. This initiative promotes an Integrated Fire Management strategy that integrates technical, scientific, and traditional indigenous knowledge. Through platforms like ExpoMIF and the Amazon Network for Integrated Fire Management (RAMIF), the program highlights the crucial role of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in fire governance, emphasizing the importance of community brigades, territorial monitoring, and the rescue of affected wildlife.

Fourth is “Pre-fire Season Activities,” which highlights whether agencies are adequately engaging stakeholders and setting up national agreements.

Fifth is “Fire Detection, Communication, and Dispatching,” which forms the real-time fire Response procedures and mechanisms.

In terms of detection, real-time fire monitoring should be integrated into national response protocols and field-level coordination.

For communication and dispatching, there could be the establishment of contingency plans to extinguish forest fires rapidly before they spread, focusing heavily on fires starting in recently deforested areas and expanding towards protected areas or Indigenous territories.

In Peru specifically (Reference 10), the most critical districts are concentrated in the Ucayali, Madre de Dios, and Huánuco regions. Regarding public budget allocation, there are gaps in the prevention of and response to forest fires, resulting in limited operational capabilities and significant disparities in the allocation and execution of public resources for disaster risk management. Overall, there is the need to strengthen systems for monitoring, early warning, planning, and institutional response regarding forest fires, prioritizing areas with the greatest historical vulnerability.

Methods

The analysis combined two primary data sources: 1) Relative Oceanic Niño Index (RONI) based on sea surface temperature anomaly (SSTA) and 2) annual primary forest loss from fires.

RONI, the standard used by NOAA for classifying El Niño (warm) and La Niña (cool) events in the eastern tropical Pacific, is the running 3-month average sea surface temperature (SST) for the Niño 3.4 region, minus the overall average tropical 3-month sea surface temperature anomaly (SSTA). For this study, we used the 3-month period of October-December for each year.

Events are defined as 5 consecutive overlapping 3-month periods at or above the +0.5 anomaly for warm (El Niño) events and at or below the -0.5 anomaly for cool (La Niña) events. The threshold is further broken down into Weak (with a 0.5 to 0.9 SST anomaly), Moderate (1.0 to 1.4), Strong (1.5 to 1.9), and Very Strong (≥ 2.0) events.

In addition to warm SSTA in the Pacific Ocean, Amazon drought conditions may also be influenced by warm SSTA in the North Tropical Atlantic Ocean (Reference 10), but our study did not account for this.

The fire analysis was based on 30-meter resolution annual forest loss data produced by the University of Maryland and also presented by Global Forest Watch. This Global Forest Loss due to fire dataset is unique in terms of being consistent across the Amazon (in contrast to country-specific estimates) and distinguishes forest loss caused directly by fire (note that virtually all Amazon fires are human-caused). The values included were ‘medium’ and ‘high’ confidence levels (code 3-4).

For the baseline, it was defined to establish areas with >30% tree canopy density in 2000. Importantly, we applied a filter to calculate only primary forest loss by intersecting the forest cover loss data with the additional dataset “primary humid tropical forests” as of 2001 (Turubanova et al 2018). For more details on this part of the methodology, see the Technical Blog from Global Forest Watch (Goldman and Weisse 2019).

The analysis was supported and reviewed by AI: Gemini and Claude

Annex

Because we have a constrained subset (N = 8), the statistical power is limited, but a clear, strong positive pattern is evident across several major metrics.

The Pearson Linear Correlation indicates a strong positive linear relationship between the magnitude of the warm anomaly and the next year’s fire area (r = +0.6146), approaching the traditional margin of statistical significance (p-value = 0.1049). This correlation is even stronger when we take the natural log of the fire area to account for natural fire activity (p-value = 0.0827).

Spearman Rank Correlation reaffirms that higher SSTA values rank alongside worse fire outcomes in the succeeding year ( +0.5476; p-value= 0.1600).

Log-Transformed Pearson Correlation (r log): +0.6474

Wildfire spread typically behaves exponentially rather than linearly. When we take the natural log of the fire area (ln{Fire}_t+1) to correct for this, the correlation strengthens to nearly +0.65, approaching the traditional margin of statistical significance (p < 0.10).

References

1. Lancet Regional Health – Americas / PMC. (2025). The 2024 South America ablaze: Health impacts and policy imperatives for protecting population health in an era of wildfires

2. IACHR (2025) REDESCA publishes report on wildfires in Bolivia and calls for urgent action to address impacts on human rights and ecosystems

3. Mongabay (2025). Brazil declares environmental emergency ahead of 2025 fire season.

4. Muggah, R., & Szabo, I. / Mongabay. (2025). Brazil is speeding-up forest fire prevention to avoid dangerous tipping points in the Amazon.

5. Lancet Regional Health – Americas / PMC. (2025). The 2024 South America ablaze. (See footnote 3.) Peru-specific governance section

6. Copa Pabón, M. V. (2026, May 15). Indigenous protest forces repeal of land privatization law in Bolivia.

7. ACTO. (2026, February–March). ACTO member countries approve Operational Understanding for Preparedness and Response to Forest Fires in the Amazon Region.

8. FAO El Niño Fire Readiness checklist (2024) As presented in the Global Fire Management Hub and informed by its Integrated Fire Management Voluntary Guidelines

9. Brown F, et al (2026). Alert related to the coming severe dry period, heat waves, fires, smoke and climate in the Madre de Dios-Peru, Acre-Brazil, Pando-Bolivia (MAP) Region – 30 April 2026. Foster Brown

10. ACCA (2026) El Niño y los incendios forestales en la Amazonía peruana, ¿qué podemos esperar para la temporada 2026-2027?

Citation

Finer M, Bodin B (2026) Implications of upcoming major El Niño event on Amazon fires. MAAP: 248.

Acknowledgements

We thank colleagues from the following organizations for helpful comments on the report: Conservación Amazónica – ACEAA in Bolivia and Conservación Amazónica – ACCA in Peru.

This work was supported by Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).

MAAP #247: River gold mining expansion in the northern Peruvian Amazon (Loreto region)

Posted on August 16, 2026August 13, 2026 by Matt Finer

Base Map. Gold mining activity in Loreto, Peru. Data: ACCA, FAP, FEMA, FZS, GGF, IBC, SERNANP.

Gold mining has been expanding in recent years across various regions of the Peruvian Amazon.

Previous reports (for example, see MAAP #241) have shown the rapid expansion of gold mining deforestation in the southern Peruvian Amazon, particularly in the Madre de Dios region.

Our reporting has also indicated that gold mining continues to expand into other Amazonian regions (see MAAP #233), notably the Loreto region in the northern Peruvian Amazon (see Base Map).

Loreto is one of the Amazonian regions most affected by river-based mining activity. Mining dredges are a direct source of river contamination due to the substances used in the gold extraction process, most notably mercury.

During our active monitoring period from 2017 to 2026, we have detected or otherwise documented over 1,500 mining dredges in the Amazonian rivers of the Loreto region (based on our detections from very-high-resolution satellite imagery and reports from other institutions, see Annex for details).

In fact, we have identified a major increase in the number of recorded mining dredges during the most recent 2025 to 2026 period, including expansion to new rivers across Loreto.

Over just these past two years (2025–2026), we have identified over 700 mining dredges in the rivers of Loreto, representing nearly half (46%) of the total going back to 2017.

Furthermore, we have now documented the presence of mining dredges in 13 rivers in Loreto: Atacuari, Chambira, Cotuhe, Curaray, Marañón, Mazan, Nanay, Napo, Patayacu, Pintuyacu, Putumayo, Tigre, and Yaguas. Of these, the rivers most affected by dredge-based mining activity are the Nanay, Marañón, Tigre, and Mazán.

Below, we present four case studies (see Base Map, Insets A–D) that illustrate the current gold mining situation in the Amazonian rivers of the Loreto region. These case studies document mining activity during the years 2025–2026 and feature high-resolution satellite imagery.

Case Studies

A. Putumayo River

Illegal gold mining activity has spread across various sections of the Putumayo River, which forms part of the Peru-Colombia border in the Loreto region. Between 2020 and 2026, we recorded a total of 29 mining dredges along the Putumayo River. Of these records, 58% (17 dredges) date from 2025–2026 (Figure A), highlighting the increase in illegal gold mining activity in recent years.

Figure A. Mining dredges located on the Putumayo River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

B. Tigre River

We have recorded illegal gold mining in various sections of the Tigre River, an Amazonian river spanning over 550 km across the Loreto region. Between 2021 and 2026, a total of 73 mining dredges were recorded along the Tigre River, making it the river with the third-highest number of historical dredge records in the region. In recent years (2025–2026), 67 mining dredges were recorded along the Tigre River, representing 91% of the total records for this river.

This situation demonstrates a major increase in illegal mining activity on the Tigre River, which has included gold extraction near the riverbanks (Figure B1), as well as the presence of mining dredges near populated areas (Figure B2).

Figure B1. Mining dredges located on the Tigre River. Data: ACCA, Google Earth.

Figure B2. Mining dredges located near a settlement on the Tigre River. Data: ACCA, Google Earth.

C. Nanay River

Gold mining activity on the Nanay River has expanded since 2021—when we first recorded gold mining dredges—a trend described in previous reports (see MAAP #187). The Nanay River is the Amazonian river most impacted by illegal mining in the Loreto region, as it accounts for the highest number of historical records of mining dredges. Between 2021 and 2026, a total of 1,076 mining dredges were recorded along various sections of the river.

During the 2025–2026 period, we documented the presence of 421 mining dredges on the Nanay River, demonstrating a steady increase in this mining activity compared to previous years (301 records in 2024, 221 records in 2023). Furthermore, mining dredges have been recorded in new sections of the Nanay River, highlighting the expansion of this mining activity and its impact along the river (Figure C1).

Figure C1. Record of mining dredges on the Nanay River for the years 2021–2026. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Furthermore, gold mining has begun to directly impact ecosystems adjacent to the Nanay River, with mining activity concentrated in areas comprising palm swamps, low-hill forests, and seasonally flooded alluvial forests. Between 2025 and 2026, we identified mining deforestation along the banks of the Nanay River (Figure C2).

Figure C2. Loss of forest cover due to mining dredging activity in the Nanay River. Data: ACCA, Plane

D. Marañón River

Illegal gold mining activity has continued to expand along the Marañón River, particularly in the Manseriche District of Datem del Marañón Province (Figure D1). In this area, gold mining operations have expanded into various zones adjacent to the river. That is, we have identified gold mining deforestation (associated with the construction of mining pits and infrastructure) along with the presence of mining dredges in the Marañón River, which represents a major escalation in terms of impact.

Figure D1. Gold mining activity on the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, FEMA, Planet.

As of June 2026, we identified 241 mining concessions in the Manseriche district according to the mining cadastre of the relevant Peruvian mining agency (INGEMMET); these include concessions that are titled (122), pending (115), extinguished (2), and other (2). As shown in Figure D1, these concessions are distributed along the Marañón River and in areas adjacent to it, reflecting an increase in mining concession applications in recent years.

On the other hand, we identified only 9 registrations in the Comprehensive Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO) for the Manseriche district. Upon verifying the mining rights associated with these nine registrations, only three are linked to mining concessions located within the district, while the other six involve mining rights that do not exist in the INGEMMET mining cadastre. Furthermore, mining activity has been recorded for only one concession associated with a REINFO registration (Golden Rose 4 mining concession).

Graph 1. Mining-related deforestation (Manseriche) and gold price (through June 2026). Data: ACCA, BCRP.

Graph 1 shows annual gold mining deforestation in the Manseriche district for the 2020–2026 period (up to June 2026).

During this period, note that annual mining deforestation has steadily increased from 2020 to 2024, coinciding with the rise of international gold prices.

Starting in 2025, we documented a major increase in mining deforestation, with more than 600 hectares impacted that year.

This rise in mining deforestation correlates with the rise in the international price of gold in 2025.

Likewise, a high number of mining concession applications were identified for the Manseriche district for that same year, with 109 new concessions recorded across various sectors of the district.

By 2026, cumulative gold mining deforestation in the Manseriche district of Loreto reached 868 hectares (Graph 1).

Between 2025 and 2026, we identified new mining deforestation in various sectors of the district, totaling 493 hectares during this two-year period (54% of the cumulative total back to 2020). Figure D2 shows the expansion of mining areas in one sector of the district, where forest loss has been recorded along the banks of the Marañón River.

Figure D2. Mining deforestation in the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet

The gold mining deforestation has occurred in areas adjacent to the Marañón River (within a zone extending up to 6 km from the river) where we have identified mining pits and infrastructure (such as camps and dredges). Figure D3 illustrates mining sites located both on land and along the banks of the Marañón River, showing sediment accumulation in mining pits resulting from gold extraction using dredges.

Figure D3. Mining-related deforestation in areas adjacent to the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

At the same time, the presence of illegal gold mining dredges has expanded along the Marañón River between 2022 and 2025. We identified 187 mining dredges on the river and in adjacent mining pools. By 2025, we recorded 108 mining dredges across various sectors of the Marañón River, representing 57% of the cumulative count. In certain sectors, we have observed sediment accumulation near the mining dredges, providing evidence of their extraction activities within the Marañón River (Figure D4).

Figure D4. Mining dredges identified on the Marañón River. Data: ACCA, Planet.

Public policies addressing the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto:
Progress, limitations, and challenges

The findings of this report demonstrate that illegal gold mining continues to expand in the Loreto region—particularly along the Nanay, Marañón, Tigre, and Putumayo Rivers and other Amazonian tributaries—despite the explicit ban on dredges and similar equipment for mining in bodies of water (established by Legislative Decree No. 1100, which regulates the interdiction of illegal mining). Consequently, the expansion of this activity is not due to a regulatory gap, but rather the Peruvian government’s difficulties in effectively enforcing an existing prohibition.

In alignment with the national regulatory framework, the Regional Government of Loreto (GOREL) has, for over two decades, promoted a set of regulations aimed at conserving Amazonian ecosystems, protecting water resources, and preventing activities incompatible with these objectives, such as illegal mining. In this context, it has approved various ordinances designed to strengthen the management and protection of the department’s river basins. Notable among these is a Regional Ordinance (Number 001-2025-GRL-CR), which reaffirms the importance of conserving and protecting priority river basin headwaters to ensure access to water for meeting the population’s basic needs and to promote the sustainability of regional ecosystems. These measures reflect a sustained regional policy aimed at protecting Amazonian rivers and recognizing their strategic importance for water security, biodiversity conservation, and the well-being of local communities.

The existence of this regulatory framework, however, has not been sufficient to curb the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto. In recent years, this activity has spread beyond specific hotspots to progressively encompass new Amazonian rivers and basins, driven by a combination of structural factors. Key among these are the limited state presence, the difficulty of exercising control over a territory defined by an extensive river network, the operations of criminal organizations, and the high profitability of gold. Compounding this situation are poverty, limited public investment, and a lack of sustainable economic alternatives for Amazonian populations; for them, illegal mining often represents the sole source of income—or one that is far more lucrative than traditional productive activities.

As a recent study points out (Shadow Gold: The Expansion of Illegal Mining and Its Effects on the Nanay River Basin, with a Focus on Women), this activity not only causes severe environmental impacts but also transforms local economies, strengthens illicit economies, and weakens territorial governance.

Peruvian Government response

The State’s response to the spread of illegal mining in Loreto has focused primarily on interdiction actions, joint operations, the destruction of dredges, and prosecutorial investigations aimed at reducing the operational capacity of organizations engaged in this activity.

Within this context, the competent authorities have carried out various operations in the main affected areas. One of the most recent cases involves interventions on the Tigre River, where authorities destroyed dredges after confirming a significant increase in extraction activity.

Our satellite monitoring, however, reveals that illegal mining quickly reappears in areas where interventions have taken place, demonstrating that while interdiction efforts are a necessary control tool, their effects tend to be temporary unless complemented by additional strategies aimed at dismantling the criminal networks, financial flows, and supply chains that sustain this illicit economy.

In addition to enforcement actions, the State has adopted preventive measures to curb the expansion of illegal mining in areas of high environmental importance. In the Nanay River basin, for instance, the acceptance of new applications and the granting of mining concessions were suspended (Note 1), and states of emergency were declared due to the contamination of the primary water supply source for the city of Iquitos. These measures represent significant progress; however, their effectiveness depends on continuous oversight and a sustained institutional presence in the area.

In terms of national policy, Supreme Decree No. 003-2025-IN—which approves the National Strategy for the Reduction and Interdiction of Illegal Mining through 2030—recognizes the need to strengthen intelligence, inter-agency coordination, and the prosecution of criminal economies linked to illegal mining, while promoting an approach that goes beyond interdiction actions.

Limitations of the state response

Despite the advances noted above, the state’s response continues to face major structural limitations. First, Loreto presents immense logistical challenges due to its vast territory and the dispersed nature of its river network. Many of the affected areas are accessible only by river—often requiring hours or even days of travel—which drives up operational costs and makes it difficult for authorities to maintain a permanent presence.

This geographical complexity takes on a critical transnational dimension in border basins such as the Putumayo or the Tigre. The vulnerability of the borders with Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador enables criminal organizations to operate with cross-border mobility—transporting illicit inputs like mercury or crossing international boundaries to evade interdiction efforts by Peruvian law enforcement—thereby highlighting the inadequacy of approaches limited solely to the local or national level.

Secondly, the institutional response remains predominantly reactive. Although interdiction efforts temporarily reduce the infrastructure used for illegal mining, there has been less progress in investigating financing chains, gold marketing, money laundering, and the supply of fuel, mercury, and machinery—factors that facilitate the rapid resumption of this activity.

Furthermore, weaknesses persist in the coordination among the entities responsible for control, oversight, and criminal prosecution. Limited coordination regarding information sharing, joint planning, and the monitoring of interventions—involving the National Government, Regional Governments, the Specialized Environmental Prosecutor’s Offices (FEMA), and the Directorate of Captaincies and Coast Guard (DICAPI)—reduces the effectiveness of the state’s response to highly adaptable organizations.

Another important limitation concerns inconsistencies in the granting and administration of mining rights in the region. Despite the ban on alluvial mining using dredges in water bodies, mining concessions have been identified in Loreto with boundaries that encompass rivers, streams, or other bodies of water, as well as concessions granted in areas where the expansion of illegal mining has been documented. While a mining concession does not in itself authorize the commencement of extraction activities—nor does its granting imply approval of environmental instruments or other necessary permits—this situation reveals weaknesses in land-use planning and in the coordination between the entities responsible for managing mining rights and those charged with protecting the environment and water resources. This creates conflicts regarding land management, increases pressure on sensitive ecosystems, and hinders efforts to prevent and control illegal mining.

Compounding this situation are the protracted nature of mining formalization processes and the repeated extensions of the Comprehensive Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO). In the Amazonian context, REINFO has created significant distortions; illegal operators frequently exploit it fraudulently as a “shield of impunity” to temporarily halt prosecutorial and interdiction actions, thereby subverting the purpose of a registry designed for small-scale and artisanal mining and using it instead to mask alluvial mining in water bodies—an activity that is strictly prohibited without exception.

Local responses

Given these limitations in the central government’s response, the coordination of local stakeholders emerges as a fundamental component in the fight against illegal mining. In Loreto, mechanisms for technical and social coordination—such as the Good Governance Platform for the Nanay River’s Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme and the Technical Group Against Illegal Mining—have been strengthened; these initiatives foster genuine collaboration among public entities, Indigenous organizations, civil society, and international cooperation partners.

Within this network, Indigenous organizations and local communities also play a fundamental role through community-based surveillance, territorial monitoring, and the issuance of early warnings regarding the spread of illegal mining. These initiatives complement state actions and demonstrate that strengthening territorial governance is an essential component for improving the effectiveness of public policies addressing illegal mining.

Those carrying out these monitoring activities, however, face a situation of particular vulnerability. In various river basins in Loreto—particularly the Nanay and Putumayo—leaders, community monitors (Note 2), and even park rangers have been subjected to threats and intimidation as a result of their efforts to report the spread of illegal mining and protect water resources. This situation demonstrates that the state’s response must not only strengthen oversight and interdiction capabilities but also guarantee adequate protection for those who contribute to defending the territory and ensuring compliance with environmental regulations. The persistence of these risks undermines territorial governance and limits community participation in the prevention and control of illegal mining.

Conclusions

The evidence presented above confirms that the expansion of illegal mining in Loreto is not due to the absence of a regulatory framework, but rather to limitations in effectively implementing existing public policies. Although the State has strengthened interdiction efforts and developed regulatory instruments to protect Amazonian river basins, these measures remain insufficient against criminal organizations possessing a high capacity for logistical, financial, and cross-border adaptation.

Consequently, a more effective response requires moving beyond the reactive and short-term approach to river-based controls. These actions must be complemented by strengthening financial and criminal intelligence targeting money laundering networks, strictly monitoring irregularities in formalization registries, effectively protecting human rights defenders, coordinating bilaterally in border areas, and designing viable, sustainable socioeconomic alternatives for local populations. Only through a comprehensive, decentralized approach—combining prevention, strategic criminal prosecution, territorial development, and the strengthening of community governance—will it be possible to sustainably curb and reduce the expansion of illegal mining in the Peruvian Amazon.

Methodology

The identification of mining dredges was based on the visual interpretation of very-high-resolution satellite imagery available on the Planet, Maxar, and Google Earth Pro platforms for Amazonian rivers in the Loreto region. Additionally, confidential reports and direct communications from various institutions regarding the presence of mining dredges in Amazonian rivers were incorporated. This information enabled the recording of mining dredges in new areas and the prioritization of monitoring—using very-high-resolution satellite imagery—in strategic sectors of the Loreto region.

The identification of deforestation caused by gold mining was based on the visual interpretation of high- and very-high-resolution satellite imagery available on the Planet, Maxar, and Google Earth Pro platforms for the Loreto region. Following this identification, deforestation was monitored using Planet NICFI monthly mosaics (4.7 m spatial resolution) to track the expansion of mining-related deforestation and identify new affected areas within the Loreto region.

Notes

1. Supreme Decree Nº022-2024-EM, Extension of the suspension of the admission of mining petitions in the area of the Nanay River, located in the district of Alto Nanay, province of Maynas, department of Loreto

2. Members of local monitoring organizations recognized by the Loreto Regional Government and members of community monitoring committees recognized by SERNANP.